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On September 21, 2006, a remarkable spectacle unfolded in a hearing
room in the Rayburn House Office Building in Washington.  A few months
earlier, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee had introduced a
resolution impeaching Federal District Judge Manuel L. Real “for high crimes
and misdemeanors.”   Now, sitting alone at the witness table, the eighty-two-1
year-old judge defended himself vigorously against accusations that he had
improperly intervened in a bankruptcy case to help a woman whose probation
he was supervising after she was convicted of various fraud offenses.  At one
point a member of the Judiciary Committee directed his gaze at the judge and
said, “Judge Real, because of your actions, arguably [a family trust involved
in the bankruptcy case] lost tens of thousands of dollars in lost rent and also
in attorneys’ fees.  Did you feel any responsibility for the losses that were
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2. Impeaching Manuel L. Real, a Judge of the United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal.,
for High Crimes and Misdemeanors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and
Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 90 (2006) [hereinafter Real
Impeachment Hearing].
3. Id.
4. See id. at 33 (reprinting complaint).  The complaint would ordinarily not be a public document,
but Judge Real included it in one of the appendices to his hearing statement.
5. Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability, Memorandum of Decision (Jan. 14, 2008),
available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/misconduct/orders/committee_memorandum.pdf.  Various
aspects of the proceedings involving Judge Real are discussed throughout this Article.
6. See Press Release, The Supreme Court of the United States (Sept. 19, 2006), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/press/pr_09-19-06.html; see also infra Part II.D.
7. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 20
(Mar. 13, 2007).  In March 2008, the Judicial Conference gave its approval to the final draft of a set of
mandatory misconduct rules.  See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
8. A key document in the regulation of federal judicial ethics is a set of illustrative rules
promulgated by the Administrative Office of United States Courts.  See infra note 133 and accompanying
incurred by the . . . trust?”   The judge responded in a firm voice, “Mr. Smith,2
I don’t know anything about the loss.”3
The Congressman’s question did not come entirely out of the blue.  It
echoed one of the accusations in a complaint against Judge Real that had been
filed more than three years earlier—a complaint that led to the initiation of
disciplinary proceedings against the judge within the judiciary.   Those4
proceedings did not conclude until January 2008, when a committee of the
Judicial Conference of the United States affirmed an order finding Judge Real
guilty of judicial misconduct.5
The entire episode involving Judge Real was a rare public manifestation
of a process that generally takes place behind closed doors and out of the
public eye: the regulation of ethics in the federal judiciary.  But it does not
stand alone.  Two days before the impeachment hearing, Chief Justice John
G. Roberts, Jr. released a detailed report on the operation of the statutory
scheme for regulating judicial misconduct.   The report was prepared by a6
committee appointed by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and chaired by
Associate Justice Stephen G. Breyer.  On the same day, the Judicial
Conference of the United States, the policymaking arm of the judiciary,
announced two major policy initiatives relating to judicial ethics.  A few
months later, the Judicial Conference took the first steps toward imposing
nationally binding rules for handling complaints of misconduct by judges.7
With this unusual convergence of events, the time is ripe for a fresh look
at the regulation of judicial ethics in the federal system.  Indeed,
notwithstanding its obvious importance, the subject has received little
attention from academics.   This Article examines the two principal areas of8
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text.  A Westlaw search (JLR database) reveals that this document was cited in one law review article
published in 2000; it has not been cited since except for one article published in 2007.  See Arthur D.
Hellman, Judges Judging Judges: The Federal Judicial Misconduct Statutes and the Breyer Committee
Report, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 426 (2007).
9. See Judicial Conference Policy on Judges’ Attendance at Privately Funded Educational Programs
(Sept. 19, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/judbrappc906c.pdf.
10. Id. at 1-2.
11. Federal Judiciary Amends Implementation of Junket Disclosures after Complaints, 75 U.S. L.
WK. 2570 (Mar. 27, 2007).
12. A leading critic of judges’ attendance at private seminars called the new policy “a dramatic
change for the better.”  Linda Greenhouse, Federal Judges Take Steps to Improve Accountability, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2006, at A20, available at 2006 WLNR 16291514.  For the current version of Advisory
Opinion No. 67, issued by the Committee on Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference, see Attendance
at Educational Seminars (2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/67.html.
13. Full assessment of the new system will not be possible until there is an opportunity to analyze
the individual judges’ reports that have now begun to appear on court websites.  Nevertheless, legislation
has been introduced in Congress to severely curtail judges’ attendance at privately funded educational
programs.  See Lawrence Hurley, Senate’s Effort to Ban Junkets Could Stall Judicial Pay Raises, DAILY
J. (San Francisco), Feb. 4, 2008, at A1.
recent controversy.  Part I deals with conflict of interest and disqualification,
with particular focus on conflicts involving judges’ financial interests.  Part
II describes and critiques the system established by Congress for identifying
and remedying misconduct by federal judges.
In the past, controversy occasionally arose over a third aspect of federal
judicial ethics: judges’ attendance at privately funded educational programs.
In September 2006, the Judicial Conference of the United States responded to
the criticism by promulgating stringent new disclosure rules.   Under the new9
rules, most providers of educational programs must disclose sources of
financial support, and judges must file public reports on the programs they
attend.10
The new regime got off to a bad start when the Administrative Office of
United States Courts (AO) failed to “promptly” post the relevant information
on its website in accordance with the Conference directive.   The AO11
acknowledged its error, and a detailed list of seminars, funders, and presenters
has now been posted.  The new policy—along with a 2004 revision to a Code
of Conduct Advisory Opinion—appears to address most, if not all, of the
concerns that have previously been raised.   On that premise, this aspect of12
federal judicial ethics will not be further addressed in this Article.13
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14. ALAN HIRSCH & KAY LOVELAND, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., RECUSAL: ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW
UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 & 144, at 5 (2002), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
Recusal.pdf/$file/Recusal.pdf [hereinafter FJC RECUSAL STUDY].
15. Id. § 455(d)(4) (emphasis added).
16. Id. § 455(c).
17. Id. § 455(e).
I.  CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND DISQUALIFICATION
Two provisions of Title 28 of the United States Code deal with conflict
of interest and the disqualification or recusal of federal judges.
(“Disqualification” and “recusal” will be treated as synonymous.)  Section 144
establishes procedures for assuring that no case is heard by a district judge
who “has a personal bias or prejudice” against or in favor of any party.
Section 455 lays down elaborate rules to govern the disqualification of judges
and avoid conflicts of interest.  Because § 455 is so much broader in its
definition of the circumstances that require disqualification, it is invoked far
more often than § 144.
As explained in a comprehensive monograph prepared for the Federal
Judicial Center, § 455 includes two “separate (though substantially
overlapping) bases for recusal.”   Subsection (a) speaks in broad general14
terms; it requires recusal “in any proceeding in which [the judge’s]
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”  Subsection (b) lists five
specific circumstances that require recusal.  These include personal bias, prior
involvement with the case, and “a financial interest . . . in a party to the
proceeding.”
A.  Conflict of Interest Based on Stock Holdings
The “financial interest” prohibition in the statute has proved to be a fertile
ground for muckraking by investigative reporters.  This is so for four
interrelated reasons.  First, the statutory bar is absolute.  Section 455 defines
“financial interest” as “ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however
small.”   Thus, it does not matter whether the judge owns many shares or only15
one; it does not matter whether the party involved in the proceeding is a small
partnership or a huge publicly held corporation like Microsoft.  Second, the
prohibition extends not only to the judge’s own financial interests, but also to
the financial interests of the judge’s “spouse or minor child residing in his
household.”   Third, the prohibition cannot be waived.   Indeed, none of the16 17
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18. See id.  In contrast, waiver is permitted when “the ground for disqualification arises only under”
§ 455(a).
19. See generally 5 U.S.C. app. § 101-111 (2000).
20. See Judges’ Legitimate Need for Security Cited by Chief Justice, THIRD BRANCH, June 2000,
at 4-5.
21. Joe Stephens, Stocks and Ethics Collide in Courtroom: K.C. Federal Judges Have Ruled on
Cases While Invested in a Litigant, KANSAS CITY STAR, Apr. 5, 1998, at A1, available at 1998 WLNR
7193177.
22. Id.
23. See Joe Stephens, Judges Rule on Firms in Their Portfolios; Appeals Jurists Attribute
Participation to Innocent Mistakes, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1999, at A1. 
specific circumstances listed in subsection (b) are subject to waiver.   Finally,18
although the statute requires judges to inform themselves about their “personal
. . . financial interests,” experience has shown that judges can easily fail to
remember or recognize that they own shares in corporations that are parties to
cases on their dockets.  When they proceed to adjudicate those cases, they are
violating § 455, however inadvertent or unknowing their conduct.
Journalists, litigants, and other citizens can monitor judges’ compliance
with § 455, but doing so requires considerable effort.  Judges, like other
federal officials, are required to file annual financial disclosure statements
listing their stock holdings.   But the reports are not readily accessible by19
anyone outside the judiciary.  The documents are filed only in Washington,
and the Judicial Conference of the United States, citing security concerns, has
resisted efforts to make their contents available on the Internet.   Moreover,20
when investigators are able to review the reports, they often find that some of
the required information has been omitted.  And because the reports are filed
annually in May and cover the previous calendar year, they will not
necessarily reflect a judge’s current holdings at the time of hearing a case.
Notwithstanding these obstacles, newspapers and advocacy groups have
occasionally undertaken investigations to determine whether federal judges
have participated in cases in spite of a conflict of interest that mandated
disqualification under the statute.  One well-known example is the study
conducted by the Kansas City Star in 1998.   The newspaper reported that21
federal judges in Kansas City and elsewhere “repeatedly have presided over
lawsuits against companies in which they own stock.”   A year later, the22
Community Rights Counsel (CRC) publicized a research report indicating that
in 1997 eight federal appellate judges took part in at least eighteen cases in
which they had a disqualifying conflict of interest.23
This evidence of repeated violations of § 455 was brought to the attention
of Congress in November 2001.  The occasion was a hearing of a
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24. Operations of Federal Judicial Misconduct Statutes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
the Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter
2001 H. Misconduct Hearing].
25. Id. at 61 (statement of Professor Arthur D. Hellman). 
26. The letter is reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 107-459, at 16-18 (2002).
27. Id. at 17.
28. Id.
congressional committee—the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and
Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee—on the operation of
the misconduct statutes.   No one seemed to dispute that the judges’24
participation in the conflict cases came about because of innocent mistakes or
memory lapses.  Nevertheless, as I observed in my own statement, “episodes
of this kind are harmful to the judiciary.  At best, the judges—and perhaps the
winning lawyers—suffer embarrassment.  At worst, a cloud is cast over the
judges’ integrity.”25
Shortly after the hearing, Subcommittee Chairman Howard Coble (R-NC)
and Ranking Member Howard Berman (D-CA) wrote to Chief Justice
Rehnquist in his capacity as presiding officer of the Judicial Conference of the
United States.   They pointed to the “questions [raised] in some minds about26
judges’ compliance with the laws governing disqualification.”   They27
explained how the existing system makes it difficult for litigants to discover
whether judges own stock that requires recusal in a particular case.  And they
suggested a concrete remedy.  They proposed that the Judicial Conference
should “require all federal courts to adopt the Iowa model” for posting
“conflict lists” on court websites.28
The “Iowa model” is an approach pioneered by the federal district courts
for the Northern and Southern Districts of Iowa.  Under that model, the court
website posts separate lists for each judge of the court.  Each list is preceded
by this statement: “Pursuant to this court’s policy of disclosing relationships
that pose potential or actual conflicts of interest, financial or otherwise, Judge
[X] will not be handling cases involving . . . .”  The list that follows may
include names of corporations, individuals, and law firms.  As the Chairman
and Ranking Member explained, this method of disclosure offers substantial
advantages in comparison with judges’ annual financial disclosure reports:
The benefits of this practice are manifest: the likelihood increases that genuine
conflicts will be flagged earlier in the litigation process; journalists and advocacy
groups will have greater access to relevant information that will enable them to
monitor judicial compliance with conflict-of-interest requirements; the lists can be
more easily updated than annual hard-copy disclosure filings; and the legitimate
privacy and safety interests of judges [are] not compromised (since the lists only
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29. Id.
30. See Will Evans, Key Bush judge under ethics cloud, SALON, May 3, 2006, http://
www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/05/03/boyle2; Will Evans, Bush withdraws nominee, SALON, Mar. 8,
2006, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/03/08/payne3.
31. See supra note 30.
32. Judicial Conference Policy on Mandatory Conflict Screening 1 (2006), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/report906appendixa.pdf.
33. Id. at 1-2.
indicate that a judge is recused from cases involving specific corporations, and
nothing more).29
The Judicial Conference did not adopt this suggestion, and in 2006
history repeated itself: blogs and advocacy groups accused two district judges
(James H. Payne of the Eastern District of Oklahoma and Terrence W. Boyle
of the Eastern District of North Carolina) of failing to recuse themselves from
cases involving companies in which they held investments.  Neither Judge
Payne nor Judge Boyle serve on one of the few courts that post judges’
conflict lists on their websites.  Both judges had been nominated to their
respective courts of appeals.   Judge Payne withdrew as a nominee, largely30
because of the conflict-of-interest accusations; Judge Boyle was not confirmed
to the appellate court (though the alleged conflicts were not the major issue).31
The new controversies did not lead the Judicial Conference to require
adoption of the Iowa model, but in September 2006 the Conference took
action of a different kind: it called upon all federal courts (except for the
Supreme Court, over which the Conference has no jurisdiction) to institute
“automatic conflict screening” using standardized hardware and software.32
The new policy—to be implemented and directed by the circuit councils—will
require all federal judges to “develop a list identifying financial conflicts for
use in conflict screening, [to] review and update the list at regular intervals,
and [to] employ the list personally or with the assistance of court staff to
participate in automated conflict screening.”33
The Judicial Conference initiative was widely applauded, and we can
hope that the new policy will reduce to a minimum the instances in which
judges participate in cases involving corporations or other entities in which
they own stock.  But only time will tell whether a purely internal mechanism
will do the job effectively or whether, as the Chairman and Ranking Member
suggested, external monitoring is a necessary supplement.  Moreover, a purely
internal screening program does not serve the interest in transparency.
Transparency instills confidence and thus has value apart from the
instrumental goal of minimizing inadvertent conflicts.
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34. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3) (2000).  Early in his tenure on the Supreme Court, then-Associate Justice
Rehnquist denied a motion for disqualification based on testimony he had given at a Congressional hearing
during his service as head of the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice.  See Laird v. Tatum,
409 U.S. 824 (1972) (mem.).  At that time the statute did not have the specific reference to “governmental
employment.”  See id. at 825.  Justice Rehnquist first focused on the “mandatory” provision that required
disqualification “in any case in which [the judge] . . . has been of counsel, [or] is or has been a material
witness.”  Id. at 828.  That provision was inapplicable, he said, because “I have neither been of counsel nor
have I been a material witness in Laird v. Tatum.”  Id. at 828.  Justice Rehnquist then turned to the statutory
language that required recusal where the judge “is so related to or connected with any party or his attorney
as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.”  Id.
at 829 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Based on an extensive review of prior practice, Justice
Rehnquist concluded: “My impression is that none of the former Justices of this Court since 1911 have
followed a practice of disqualifying themselves in cases involving points of law with respect to which they
had expressed an opinion or formulated policy prior to ascending to the bench.”  Id. at 831.  Justice
Rehnquist’s refusal to recuse himself in Laird v. Tatum has been severely criticized.  See, e.g., Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589 (1987).
35. §§ 455(b)(5)(i)-(ii).
B.  Other Issues Relating to Disqualification and Conflict of Interest
Except for the “financial interest” provision, the specific prohibitions of
§ 455(b) seldom become the subject of media coverage, nor have they given
rise to an extensive body of reported decisions.  This is so in part because the
other circumstances that require recusal occur less frequently than financial
conflicts and in part because the criteria are easily applied.  For example,
under § 455(b)(2), a judge must not sit on a case if “in private practice he
served as lawyer in the matter in controversy.”  But after a judge has been on
the bench for several years, such cases will be rare.  Nor will there be many
cases in which a judge must recuse himself because he “has served in
governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel,
adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding.”   The statute also34
requires recusal where a judge or a close relative is a party to the proceeding
or is acting as a lawyer in it.   Circumstances of that kind will generally be so35
obvious that recusal will be immediate, automatic, and not worthy of notice
anywhere outside the docket sheet.
A different situation is presented by § 455(b)(1), which provides that a
judge must disqualify himself “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party.”  One would not expect to see many cases in which a
federal judge was found to have an actual “personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party,” and one does not.  As the Seventh Circuit said more than
20 years ago: “The disqualification of a judge for actual bias or prejudice is
a serious matter, and it should be required only when the bias or prejudice is
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36. United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1202 (7th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir. 2000). 
39. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Diamondstone v. Macaluso, 148 F.3d 113,
120-21 (2d Cir. 1988)).
40. Id. at 126-27 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Drexel Burnham Lambert
Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1313 (2d Cir. 1988)).
41. United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 287 (4th Cir. 1998). 
42. In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990).
43. In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 782 (3d Cir. 1992).
proved by compelling evidence.”   That is an extremely stringent standard36
and, not surprisingly, there are few decisions holding that a litigant has made
the necessary showing.
As a practical matter, however, the difficulty of proving actual bias under
§ 455(b)(1) counts for little.  The reason is that the concerns that underlie
§ 455(b)(1) are served by reliance on § 455(a), which requires disqualification
“in any proceeding in which [a judge’s] impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.”   The courts have held that § 455(a) “adopts the objective37
standard of a reasonable observer.”   To be sure, the reasonable observer is38
one who is “fully informed of the underlying facts.”   As the Second Circuit39
has said, “the existence of the appearance of impropriety is to be determined
‘not by considering what a straw poll of the only partly informed man-in-the-
street would show[,] but by examining the record facts and the law, and then
deciding whether a reasonable person knowing and understanding all the
relevant facts would recuse the judge.’”   But the courts also stress that “the40
hypothetical reasonable observer is not the judge himself or a judicial
colleague but a person outside the judicial system.”   This external41
perspective elevates the standard at least to some degree, because “these
outside observers are less inclined to credit judges’ impartiality and mental
discipline than the judiciary itself will be.”42
As a corollary of this approach, the courts are careful to emphasize that
a finding that recusal is required under § 455(a) is not tantamount to saying
that the judge harbors actual prejudice toward a litigant or class of litigants.
Typical is this statement by the Third Circuit: “We underscore that we are not
intimating that Judge Kelly actually harbors any illegitimate pro-plaintiff bias.
The problem, however, is that regardless of his actual impartiality, a
reasonable person might perceive bias to exist, and this cannot be
permitted.”   In one high-profile case, the Eighth Circuit went so far as to say43
that “we have every confidence that” the judge would “handle the case in a
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44. United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1325 (8th Cir. 1996).  The case involved an indictment
brought by Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr.  The court noted the judge’s connections with President
and Mrs. Clinton, and the Clintons’ connection to the defendant.
45. Id. at 1324.
46. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860-61 (1988) (quoting opinion
below, 796 F.2d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 1986)).
47. Id. at 865; see also id. at 866 (noting an “unfortunate coincidence that although the judge
regularly attended meetings of the Board of Trustees” of the university affected by the case before him, he
did not attend the meeting at which the transaction was discussed).
48. Id. at 861.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 865-70.  Although the Court purported to accept the district court’s finding that the judge
“did not have actual knowledge of” the relevant facts, id. at 864, the opinion as a whole gives the strong
impression that the Justices in the majority believed otherwise.
51. See United States v. Collins, 972 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1992).
52. See infra Part II.A.
fair and impartial manner.”   But that did not negate the necessity for44
reassigning the case based on “the risk of a perception of judicial bias or
partiality.”45
The statute’s focus on the reasonable observer’s perception of bias led the
Supreme Court to conclude that when the circumstances create an appearance
of partiality, recusal is required under § 455(a) “even when a judge lacks
actual knowledge of the facts indicating his interest or bias in the case.”   The46
case was Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., and it involved a
district judge whose failures of memory were aptly characterized by the Court
as “remarkable.”   The Court rejected the argument that its interpretation of47
the statute “call[s] upon judges to perform the impossible—to disqualify
themselves based on facts they do not know.”   Rather, the statutory48
requirement comes into play when the judge learns of the disqualifying facts;
the judge is then “called upon to rectify an oversight and to take the steps
necessary to maintain public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.”49
If the judge fails to do so, relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be available.  In the case before it, the
Court found that the circumstances were so suspicious that the court of
appeals was justified in reopening the closed litigation and ordering a new
trial.   By way of postscript, three years after the Court’s decision, the judge50
whose memory allegedly failed him—Robert F. Collins—was convicted of
bribery in an unrelated criminal prosecution.   He resigned from the bench51
and thereby avoided impeachment.52
The body of decisions applying § 455(a) is large and varied.
Occasionally a court of appeals uses the case before it as a vehicle to establish
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53. Clemmons v. Wolfe, 377 F.3d 322, 329 (3d Cir. 2004).
54. Sometimes a court of appeals, without laying down a categorical rule, will provide guidelines
for a recurring situation.  See, e.g., United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 911-12 (9th Cir. 2008)
(discussing at length the factors a judge should weigh in deciding whether he is obliged “to recuse himself
sua sponte in response to threats made against him, his family members or associates”).  For another
example of this practice, see infra text accompanying note 69.
55. United States v. Bremers, 195 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 1999).
56. Because the Federal Judicial Center monograph provides a thorough summary of the cases
applying § 455(a), the discussion here is illustrative rather than comprehensive.  See FJC RECUSAL STUDY,
supra note 14, at 15-41.
57. United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1995).
58. In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 293 (3d Cir. 2004).  The court explained:
The gravamen of the [p]etitions is that Judge Wolin was tainted by the involvement of two
court-appointed advisors who, at the same time that they were supposed to be giving neutral
advice in the Five Asbestos Cases, represented a class of tort claimants in another, unrelated
asbestos-driven bankruptcy and espoused views therein on the same disputed issues that are at
the core of the Five Asbestos Cases.
Id. at 302.  Shortly after the Third Circuit removed Judge Wolin from the asbestos case, the judge resigned
from the bench and entered private practice.
59. United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993).
a rule applicable to an entire class of cases.  For example, the Third Circuit
exercised its supervisory power to require that district judges within the circuit
recuse themselves “from participating in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus
petition of a defendant raising any issue concerning the trial or conviction
over which that judge presided in his or her former capacity as a state court
judge.”   But that kind of categorical rulemaking is rare.   Ordinarily, recusal53 54
motions under § 455(a) “are fact driven,” and the outcome will depend on the
court’s “independent examination of the unique facts and circumstances of the
particular claim at issue.”   A few examples will be sufficient to give a sense55
of the kinds of judicial behavior that have generated published appellate or
district court opinions.56
A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a district
judge should have recused herself from a criminal case where the record
showed “no small amount of resentment and animosity, if not blind hatred,”
between a close personal friend of the judge and the defendant.   The Third57
Circuit (also over a dissent) ordered a district judge to disqualify himself from
further participation in complex asbestos-related bankruptcy litigation because
of his close relationship with certain “consulting [a]dvisors” who themselves
had a conflict of interest.   In several cases, the courts of appeals have found58
that public comments by district judges gave rise to reasonable questions
about the judges’ partiality, requiring recusal under § 455(a).  Noteworthy
examples are cases involving an abortion protest in Kansas,  racial59
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60. In re Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d 164 (1st Cir. 2001).
61. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
62. United States v. S. Fla. Mgmt. Dist., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
63. In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 385, 388 (7th Cir. 1990).
64. Id. at 386.
65. United States v. Pitera, 5 F.3d 624, 626-27 (2d Cir. 1993).
66. Id. at 626.
67. In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2001).
68. Id. at 198.
69. Id. at 202.
assignments in the Boston public schools,  and the Government’s antitrust60
suit against Microsoft Corp.   In a prominent Florida environmental case, the61
chief judge of the district court granted a motion to disqualify a district judge
who had made a series of comments to newspapers manifesting apparent bias
against the parties on one side of the litigation.62
On the other side, the Seventh Circuit held that a district judge was not
required to recuse himself from hearing a Voting Rights Act suit even though
he had made political contributions to two of the defendant officials before his
appointment to the federal bench.   The court said that, as a general matter,63
“pre-judicial” political activity should not be viewed as “prejudicial.”   The64
Second Circuit found that a district judge acted appropriately in presiding over
a narcotics trial seven months after giving a videotaped lecture to a
governmental task force in which she advised the assembled agents and
prosecutors about steps they could take to increase the prospects for
conviction in narcotics cases.   The court emphasized two significant65
countervailing facts: “the lecture to the task force included several emphatic
criticisms of prosecutors”; and the judge also gave a lecture to criminal
defense lawyers.   A few years later, the same court held that a district judge66
was not required to recuse himself from hearing an environmental case against
Texaco, Inc., after attending an expense-paid seminar on environmental issues
sponsored by an organization that received some funding from Texaco.   The67
court relied on the “indirect and minor funding role” that Texaco played and
on “the lack of a showing that any aspect of the seminar touched upon an issue
material to the disposition of a claim or defense in the present litigation.”68
Although the court said that the outcome of the case was “not in doubt,” the
panel wrote “at some length” to provide judges with “general guidance as to
when attendance at meetings, seminars, or other presentations may be
problematic.”69
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70. 510 U.S. 540 (1994). 
71. Id. at 554. 
72. Id. at 555 (citation omitted).
73. FJC RECUSAL STUDY, supra note 14, at 21.
74. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555.
75. United States v. Franco-Guillen, 196 F. App’x 716 (10th Cir. 2006).
76. Id. at 717.
77. Id. at 718.
78. Id. at 719.
An important limitation on § 455(a) was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
in the 1994 decision in Liteky v. United States.   The Court held in Liteky that70
the so-called “extrajudicial source” doctrine applies to § 455(a).  Although the
Court asserted that “there is not much doctrine to the doctrine,”  the opinion71
makes it very difficult for a litigant to secure recusal without relying on an
“extrajudicial source.”  This follows from two propositions endorsed by the
Court:
First, judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion.  In and of themselves (i.e., apart from surrounding comments or
accompanying opinion), they . . . can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the
degree of favoritism or antagonism required . . . when no extrajudicial source is
involved. . . .  Second, opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced
or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings,
do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-
seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.72
Given this language, it is predictable that “courts of appeals rarely reverse
refusals to recuse when the alleged partiality did not derive from an
extrajudicial source.”73
The Court in Liteky was careful, however, to distinguish between rulings
by a judge and comments that a judge might make incident to a ruling.   In74
rare cases, comments in the course of a judicial proceeding can demonstrate
bias requiring recusal.  The point is illustrated by a recent Tenth Circuit
decision involving a colloquy at a sentencing hearing following a plea
agreement.   The trial judge said, “I will not put up with this from these75
Hispanics or anybody else, any other defendants.”   This was followed by76
another reference to “a Hispanic defendant” who was “lying” to the judge.77
The court of appeals held that the judge should have recused himself sua
sponte, saying, “The judge’s statements on the record would cause a
reasonable person to harbor doubts about his impartiality, without regard to
whether the judge actually harbored bias against [the defendant] on account
of his Hispanic heritage.”78
202 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:189
79. United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2007).
80. Petition for Mandamus at 49, United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2007) (No.
06-3704).
81. Wecht, 484 F.3d at 227 (Bright, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 220 (internal quotation marks omitted) (majority opinion).
83. Occasionally, as in the Florida environmental case discussed in the text, a trial judge will refer
a recusal motion to another judge of the district court rather than deciding the question himself.
84. FJC RECUSAL STUDY, supra note 14, at 68.
85. Id. at 65.
86. See, e.g., Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 648-49 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc).  This decision led
to an ugly public dispute between the district judge, Charles A. Shaw of the Eastern District of Missouri,
In another recent criminal case, the dissenting judge on a Third Circuit
panel argued that the district judge’s judicial rulings, combined with
questionable ex parte advocacy by the prosecution, sufficed to require recusal
under the Liteky standard.   The defendant in the case was Dr. Cyril Wecht,79
the well-known forensic pathologist.  Wecht asserted that the charges against
him were politically motivated and that a reasonable “man in the street” might
perceive that “the Government and the court were actually in league.”   The80
dissenting judge agreed that the record showed an appearance of partiality:
The circumstances of this case present the rare occasion when a judge’s judicial
rulings demonstrate the appearance of bias because they began with and were
possibly tainted by improper, or at least highly questionable, ex parte advocacy by
the Government.  This ex parte advocacy was tantamount to an extrajudicial source
and permeated the rulings of the District Court such that one cannot avoid discerning
the appearance of partiality.81
However, the panel majority, although criticizing some of the district judge’s
actions and comments, found that the defendant had “failed to demonstrate the
high degree of favoritism or antagonism that is required under Liteky.”82
As these citations illustrate, a trial judge’s refusal to recuse himself or
herself is subject to appellate review.   Sometimes, as in the Tenth Circuit83
case involving comments about Hispanics, the issue is raised on appeal from
a final judgment.  More often, as in the Wecht prosecution, the party seeking
recusal files an interlocutory appeal.  “All courts of appeals permit a party to
seek interlocutory review via mandamus, reasoning that, at least in some
cases, the damage to public confidence in the justice system (or perhaps to the
litigants) would not be undone by post-judgment appeal.”   Except in the84
Seventh Circuit, the courts of appeals apply an “abuse of discretion”
standard.   On occasion, the reviewing court, rather than requiring a judge to85
step down from a case, will suggest that the judge reconsider his refusal to
recuse.86
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and the court of appeals.  On remand from the Eighth Circuit, Judge Shaw recused himself but wrote an
angry opinion asserting that “race played a role in the [en banc] majority’s decision.”  Moran v. Clarke, 213
F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1075 (E.D. Mo. 2002).  The Eighth Circuit responded with a unanimous en banc opinion
that sharply rebuked the judge for his “baseless, personal, racially oriented speculations” that violated “the
district court’s own solemn obligation” to “uphold the integrity of the judiciary.”  Moran v. Clarke, 309
F.3d 516, 518 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam).
87. As then-Justice Rehnquist put it, “generally the Court as an institution leaves [disqualification]
motions, even though they be addressed to it, to the decision of the individual Justices to whom they refer.”
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 1301, 1301 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.).
88. Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J.).
89. Some academics are troubled by the absence of a procedure for review of a Justice’s decision
not to recuse.  See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 34; Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Hen House?:
Recusal and the Procedural Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107 (2004).
90. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).




When a Justice of the United States Supreme Court denies a motion to
recuse, appellate review is not available.  Indeed, under the Court’s practice,
decisions about recusal are made solely by the Justice whose participation is
being challenged; the other members of the Court play no part (unless the
Justice chooses to consult them).   On occasion, Justices write opinions87
explaining why they have declined to disqualify themselves.  In 2003, Justice
Scalia published a lengthy opinion explaining why he denied a motion to
recuse himself in a case involving Vice President Cheney.   The motion was88
based on news reports about a duck hunting trip in which Justice Scalia and
the Vice President participated.89
An unusual episode involving the possibility of recusal by Justice Stephen
G. Breyer came to light early in 2005.  Justice Breyer had served as counsel
to the Senate Judiciary Committee in the 1970s when Congress was
considering the legislation that became the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
(SRA).  Later he served as a member of the commission that formulated the
initial set of Sentencing Guidelines.  In 2004, the Supreme Court was poised
to hear cases that would determine the validity of the Guidelines under the
Sixth Amendment.   Was Justice Breyer required to recuse himself from90
taking part in the decisions?  Uncertain, he consulted an academic expert on
legal ethics, Professor Stephen Gillers.   Gillers concluded that there was “no91
. . . reasonable basis to question [Justice Breyer’s] impartiality,” and that the
Justice could participate in the cases.   Other experts argued that Justice92
Breyer should not have played a role in “deciding on the life or death of his
own brainchild.”93
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94. See Real Impeachment Hearing, supra note 2, at 123.
95. Two months after the impeachment hearing, the Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit
reprimanded Judge Real for the conduct that was subject of the hearing; however, the order of reprimand
was not officially made public until January 2008.  Letter of Chief Judge Alex Kozinski to Hon. Manuel
L. Real (Jan. 17, 2008), available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/misconduct/orders/real_reprimand_
letter.pdf.
96. Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Cincom Sys., Inc., No. CV-97-08143-R, 2000 WL 1023224, at
*4 (9th Cir. July 25, 2000) (unpublished table decision).
97. The court acted similarly in a criminal case, albeit without explicitly invoking § 2106.  The court
found that “Judge Real exceeded his authority” in staying a bail order entered by a magistrate judge in
another judicial district.  The court’s order continued: “Because of the appearance of bias, the Chief Judge
of the District Court . . . shall assign the matter . . . to a judge other than Judge Real.”  Nicherie v. United
States District Court, No. 04-71066 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 2004) (on file with the author); see Paul Lieberman
& David Rosenzweig, Judicial Battle Erupts Over Suspect’s Release, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at B1.
In yet another criminal case, the court of appeals, again without citing § 2106, ordered “a new trial before
a different judge” because the defendants “were prejudiced by [Judge Real’s] excessive and biased
interventions.”  United States v. Hall, No. 06-50356, 2008 WL 748942, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 2008).
98. Obrey v. England, 215 F. App’x 621, 623 (9th Cir. 2006) (mem.).
99. Id. at 624.
C.  Reassignment “to Preserve the Appearance of Justice”
Independent of § 455, when a case is remanded for further proceedings
in the district court, the court of appeals has power to order that the case be
reassigned to a different judge.  This authority comes from 28 U.S.C. § 2106,
which provides in general terms that all federal appellate courts, in reviewing
cases, may “require such further proceedings . . . as may be just under the
circumstances.”  When Judge Manuel Real testified at the House Judiciary
impeachment hearing, he emphasized that “I have never been sanctioned for
any judicial misconduct.”   That was correct at the time, but on several94
occasions the court of appeals had reassigned Judge Real’s cases “to preserve
the appearance of justice.”   In one of the cases Judge Real denied a litigant’s95
motions before they were even filed; the record also reflected “incidents of
animosity” toward the party’s counsel.   The court of appeals thus used96
§ 2106 as a device for enforcing an ethical standard almost identical to that of
§ 455(a).   The court did so again a few weeks after the impeachment hearing.97
It found that Judge Real, presiding over an employment discrimination suit,
“fail[ed] faithfully to apply our prior decision in [the] case.”   The court98
acknowledged that the plaintiff had not satisfied the “demanding” test for
proving actual judicial bias, but it ordered reassignment under § 2106 “to
preserve the appearance of justice.”99
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100. In the Seventh Circuit, reassignment is the norm in any case tried by the district court.  See 7TH
CIR. R. 36; Cange v. Stotler & Co., 913 F.2d 1204, 1207-08 (7th Cir. 1990).  The court of appeals thus
avoids having to determine whether particular circumstances suggest “any bias or mindset” on the part of
the district judge.  Id. at 1208.
101. Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
102. Id. at 334.
103. Id.
104. United States v. Andrews, 390 F.3d 840, 851 (5th Cir. 2004).
105. Id.
106. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554.
107. See, e.g., Nicherie v. United States District Court, No. 04-71066 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 2004) (on file
with the author); United States v. Londono, 100 F.3d 236, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1996), abrogated on other
grounds by United States v. Mercurris, 192 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 1999).
Other courts of appeals have invoked their supervisory authority and
§ 2106 in a variety of circumstances involving evidence of bias or antagonism
on the part of a district judge.   For example, the District of Columbia Circuit100
removed District Judge Royce C. Lamberth, Jr., from a long-running case
brought by beneficiaries of Indian land trusts against the Department of the
Interior as their trustee.   The court found that Judge Lamberth had made a101
“parade of serious charges” against the Department, including accusations of
racism, “all unconnected to the issue before the district court.”   The court102
also relied on an “unbroken string” of reversals, including one ruling in which
the district court “both assumed the mantle of a prosecutor and authorized
biased investigations.”   The Fifth Circuit removed District Judge Samuel103
Fred Biery, Jr., from a criminal case “because of [the] judge’s brazen
antagonism to both the tenets of the [sentencing] guidelines and to [the
defendant].”   The appellate court condemned Judge Biery’s behavior in104
extraordinarily strong language: “[W]e remove the district judge from this
case because he has breached the barrier between the rule of law and the
exercise of personal caprice.”105
It is not clear whether the Liteky guidelines apply to the exercise of
supervisory power by courts of appeals under § 2106.  The Supreme Court
said in Liteky that § 2106 “may permit a different standard,”  and courts of106
appeals have sometimes ordered reassignment of cases based on an
appearance of bias created by a judge’s prior rulings in the proceedings under
review.107
D.  Financial-Interest Disqualification in Perspective
At first blush, the disqualification statutes may appear schizophrenic in
their application.  On the one hand, the hundreds of decisions applying
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108. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
109. United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2007), discussed supra Part I.B.
110. From 1789 through 1980, only 10 federal judges were impeached by the House.  Four (Chase,
Peck, Swayne, and Louderback) were acquitted by the Senate.  Two (Delahay and English) resigned before
the Senate held an impeachment trial.  Four judges were convicted and removed from office (Pickering,
Humphries, Archbald, and Ritter).  For a detailed account, see EMILY FIELD VAN TASSEL & PAUL
FINKELMAN, IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY FROM 1787 TO THE PRESENT (1999).
111. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL, 152 F.R.D.
265, 326 (1993) [hereinafter NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT].  In 1939, Judge Martin T. Manton of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals was convicted of crimes committed while he served as a federal judge,
but he resigned from the bench before the criminal prosecution began.  See JOSEPH BORKIN, THE CORRUPT
§ 455(a) look closely at the particular circumstances and ask whether “a
reasonable person knowing and understanding all the relevant facts would
recuse the judge.”   Thus, when Dr. Cyril H. Wecht filed a petition for108
mandamus seeking to disqualify District Judge Arthur Schwab from presiding
over his criminal fraud prosecution, the appellate panel considered the case for
seven months before issuing a lengthy decision rejecting the request on a 2-1
vote.   On the other hand, a financial interest always requires recusal even109
if no reasonable person would fear bias on the particular facts—for example,
where the judge owns a few shares of stock in a large publicly held
corporation and the case barely meets the jurisdictional minimum.
The discrepancy exists, but for good reasons.  Section 455(a) is
necessarily fact-intensive because no formula can adequately capture the
varieties of judicial behavior that might cause a reasonable person to question
a judge’s impartiality.  At the same time, there is sound justification for
retaining the absolute rule for financial interests.  Even with that rule, judges
have had difficulty keeping track of their investments and recusing themselves
where a conflict exists.  Without a bright-line rule, screening for conflicts
would require a much more elaborate mechanism.  And monitoring by
litigants, by outside observers, and by the judiciary itself would be a much
more complex undertaking.  The absolute prohibition made good sense when
Congress revised the statute in 1974; it makes good sense today.
II.  OPERATION OF THE MISCONDUCT STATUTES
For most of the nation’s history, the only formal procedure for dealing
with misconduct by federal judges was the cumbersome process of
impeachment.   Criminal prosecution was a theoretical possibility, but up to110
1980, “no sitting federal judge was ever prosecuted and convicted of a crime
committed while in office.”   A 1939 statute created judicial councils within111
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JUDGE: AN INQUIRY INTO BRIBERY AND OTHER HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS, at 27, 45 (1962).  Since 1980, four federal judges have been convicted by juries of crimes
committed while in office.  Two (Claiborne and Nixon) were impeached and removed from office; the other
two (Collins and Aguilar) resigned from the bench.  See infra Part II.A.
112. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1969); PETER GRAHAM FISH,
THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 417-26 (1973).
113. Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).  As
the name suggests, the Act, in addition to establishing a formal process for dealing with allegations of
judicial misconduct, sought to reinvigorate the circuit judicial councils as instruments of circuit governance.
See generally Robert H. Hall, Federal Circuit Judicial Councils: A Legislative History and Revisions
Needed Today, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1994).
114. S. REP. NO. 96-362, at 3 (1979), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3415, 4317.
115. Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willging, Decentralized Self-Regulation, Accountability, and
Judicial Independence Under the Federal Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
25, 29 (1993).
116. Unfortunately, the most readily available primary source for the legislative history of the 1980
Act contains only the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 1873, the 1979 bill that would have
created a new Court on Judicial Conduct and Disability.  See S. REP. NO. 96-362, at 3 (1979), as reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3415, 4316-17.  For an authoritative exposition of the legislation Congress enacted,
one must look at the House Report, H.R. REP. NO. 96-1313 (1980).  See also Stephen B. Burbank,
Procedural Rulemaking Under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of
1980, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 283, 291-308 (1982) (recounting the origins of the 1980 Act).
117. For example, when the House passed the final version of the legislation, Congressman Robert
W. Kastenmeier stated: “[B]oth the House and the Senate Judiciary Committees believe that there should
the circuits, but their powers were vaguely defined, particularly with respect
to authority over individual judges.112
That era ended with the enactment of the Judicial Councils Reform and
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (to give it its full name).   The113
1980 law was the product of compromise.  Powerful members of the Senate
favored a much more radical proposal, one that would have created a new
national tribunal with power to remove judges who had committed serious
misconduct.   However, the Judiciary Committee leadership in the House114
was deeply skeptical of this approach.  Ultimately the two Houses agreed on
a more modest measure.  The new law created a regime that has aptly been
described as one of “decentralized self-regulation.”   Codified as § 372(c) of115
the Judicial Code, it established a new set of procedures for judicial discipline
and vested primary responsibility for implementing them in the federal
judicial circuits.116
A.  Evolution of the Regulatory Framework
One element of the compromise that produced the 1980 Act was the
assurance of continuing legislative oversight.   Consistent with this117
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be a continuing dialog between the legislative and judicial branches, and vigorous oversight by Congress.”
126 CONG. REC. 28,617 (1980).  Rep. Kastenmeier was the sponsor and principal drafter of the compromise
bill.
118. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified in
scattered sections of U.S.C.).
119. See NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 111.
120. See Barr & Willging, supra note 115, at 88; Richard Marcus, Who Should Discipline Federal
Judges, and How?, 149 F.R.D. 375 (1993).
121. 2001 H. Misconduct Hearing, supra note 24.
122. H.R. 3892, 107th Cong. (2002).
123. The legislation was enacted as part of the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations
Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002).  The standalone version, H.R. 3892, was
passed by the House in July 2002.  For the legislative history, see H.R. REP. NO. 107-459 (2002).
124. H.R. 5219, 109th Cong. (2006).  Chairman Sensenbrenner had been thinking about the subject
for more than two years.  For example, in remarks to the Judicial Conference of the United States in 2004,
he raised the question “whether the disciplinary authority delegated to the Judiciary has been responsibly
exercised and ought to continue.”  F. James Sensenbrenner, House Judiciary Committee Chairman,
Remarks Before the U.S. Judicial Conference Regarding Congressional Oversight Responsibility of the
Judiciary (Mar. 17, 2004) (transcript available at http://judiciary.house.gov/newscenter.aspx?A=409).  He
referred to the “decidedly mixed record” of the judiciary in investigating and imposing appropriate
discipline for misconduct.  Id.
commitment, Congress in 1990 enacted a modest package of amendments to
the statute.   The same legislation also created a National Commission on118
Judicial Discipline and Removal.  In 1993 the National Commission published
a thorough report as well as an extensive compilation of working papers.119
Particularly noteworthy are the studies carried out at the Commission’s behest
by the Federal Judicial Center and by Professor Richard Marcus.   These120
studies constitute a rich source of detailed information that is enormously
useful in showing how the 1980 Act was being implemented at the everyday
operational level during its first decade.
The next major step in Congress’s performance of its oversight role came
in 2001 when a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee held a
hearing on the “operation of [the] federal misconduct statutes.”   Following121
the hearing, Chairman Coble and Ranking Member Berman introduced the
Judicial Improvements Act of 2002.   Their bill became law in late 2002.122 123
The legislation further revised the provisions governing the handling of
complaints against judges, primarily by codifying some of the procedures
adopted by the judiciary through rulemaking.  The new law also gave the
judicial misconduct provisions their own chapter in the United States Code,
Chapter 16.
Congress returned to the subject of judicial misconduct in 2006.
Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner of the House Judiciary Committee
introduced legislation to create an Inspector General for the Judicial Branch.124
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125. H.R. 5219, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006); see Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act
of 2006: Hearing on H.R. 5219 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter 2006 Judicial Transparency Hearing].
Senator Chuck Grassley introduced a companion measure in the Senate.  S. 2678, 109th Cong. (2006).  No
hearings were held on that bill.
126. A new bill has been introduced in the 110th Congress, along with a companion Senate measure.
See H.R. 785, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 461, 110th Cong. (2007).
127. See Real Impeachment Hearing, supra note 2, at 122 (statement of Professor Arthur D.
Hellman).
128. See id. at 123.  For a detailed account, see VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 110.
129. See United States v. Collins, 972 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1992).  The impeachment resolution was
H.R. Res. 207, 103d Cong. (1993).  Judge Collins was the subject of the Supreme Court decision in
Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988), discussed supra Part I.B.
130. Mary Jacoby, Judge Resigns and Kills Impeachment Hearings, ROLL CALL, Aug. 12, 1993.  An
impeachment resolution was also introduced against Judge Robert P. Aguilar after he was convicted of
endeavoring to obstruct justice and illegally disclosing a wiretap application.  H.R. Res. 177, 103d Cong.
(1993) (Rep. Sensenbrenner).  Both convictions were ultimately overturned on appeal, but Judge Aguilar
resigned from the bench in exchange for the Government’s agreement not to pursue the prosecution further.
See Eric Slater, U.S. Drops Case Against Judge, Who Resigns, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 1996, at A3, available
at 1996 WLNR 5117590.
131. See infra Part II.F.4.
The primary task of the new office would have been to “conduct
investigations of . . . possible misconduct in office of judges . . . that may
require oversight or other action within the Judicial Branch or by
Congress.”   A hearing was held on the bill, and an amended version was125
approved by the House Judiciary Committee, but the legislation died with the
109th Congress.126
In addition to evaluating and revising the laws governing judicial
misconduct, Congress has continued to perform its constitutional role of
considering impeachment of judges who are alleged to have committed “high
crimes or misdemeanors.”  In the late 1980s, three federal judges were
impeached and removed from office—Judge Harry E. Claiborne of Nevada
(1986), Judge Alcee L. Hastings of Florida (1989), and Judge Walter L. Nixon
of Mississippi (also 1989).   All had engaged in conduct that involved127
criminality or corruption.   In 1993, the Chairman of the House Judiciary128
Committee, Jack Brooks (D-TX), took steps to initiate impeachment
proceedings against District Judge Robert F. Collins, who had been convicted
of bribery and obstruction of justice.   Before a hearing could be held, the129
judge resigned from the bench.   As already noted, in 2006 a resolution of130
impeachment was introduced against District Judge Manuel L. Real.  A
hearing was held, but the proceedings went no further, in part because a new
inquiry was moving forward within the judicial branch.131
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132. JAMES R. BROWNING, CHARLES CLARK & COLLINS J. SEITZ, ILLUSTRATIVE RULES GOVERNING
COMPLAINTS OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AND DISABILITY (1986).
133. ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, ILLUSTRATIVE RULES GOVERNING COMPLAINTS OF JUDICIAL
MISCONDUCT AND DISABILITY (rev. 2000) [hereinafter ILLUSTRATIVE RULES].
134. Id. Rule 1(a).
135. To be sure, there was support for the Illustrative Rules’ approach.  For example, key players in
both the House and the Senate quoted an American Bar Association report stating that “[t]he major purpose
of judicial discipline is not to punish judges.”  See 126 CONG. REC. 28,091 (1980) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini); id. at 25,370 (statement of Rep. Railsback).  But at least in the Senate, much attention focused
on devising an alternative to impeachment as a means of disciplining judges who engage in misconduct.
This may be forward-looking, but it is also punitive.
136. For example, the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council emphasized the language quoted in the text
when it endorsed the dismissal of a complaint against Judge Real alleging the same misconduct that was
the subject of the impeachment hearing.  See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F.3d 1179, 1182
(9th Cir. Jud. Council 2006); see also RULES OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT GOVERNING
COMPLAINTS OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT OR DISABILITY Rule 1 [hereinafter NINTH CIRCUIT MISCONDUCT
RULES].
137. JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMMITTEE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980: A REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, 239 F.R.D. 116 (2006)
[hereinafter BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT].
The judiciary too has taken steps to fill in the contours of the misconduct
legislation.  In 1986, a committee of chief circuit judges prepared a set of
Illustrative Rules Governing Judicial Misconduct and Disability.   These132
rules, accompanied by an extensive commentary, addressed many procedural
and substantive issues that were not resolved by the statute itself.  A revised
set of the Illustrative Rules was promulgated by the Administrative Office of
United States Courts in 2000.   Most of the circuits have adopted rules based133
on the Illustrative Rules.
Perhaps more important than the procedural details in the rules is the
philosophy that the document articulates.  Rule 1 states that the purpose of the
1980 law “is essentially forward-looking and not punitive.  The emphasis is
on correction of conditions that interfere with the proper administration of
justice in the courts.”   This is not necessarily the impression that one would134
get from the legislative history of the Act.   But the Illustrative Rules’135
rejection of a “punitive” purpose has been widely influential in the
administration of the misconduct statutes.136
In 2004, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist appointed a committee
chaired by Justice Stephen Breyer to assess how the Judicial Branch has
administered the 1980 Act and whether “there are any real problems” in its
implementation.  The Breyer Committee issued a lengthy and detailed public
report in September 2006.   The committee’s findings will be summarized137
later in this Article.
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138. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY, RULES FOR
JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS (2008) [hereinafter MISCONDUCT RULES
2008], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/library/judicialmisconduct/jud_conduct_and_disability_
308_app_B_rev.pdf; see also News Release, National Rules Adopted for Judicial Conduct and Disability
Proceedings (Mar. 11, 2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/2008/judicial_conf.cfm.
139. An initial draft of the rules was issued for public comment in July 2007, and the draft was the
subject of a public hearing in September 2007.  A transcript of the hearing is available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/library/judicialmisconduct/hearing/transcriptSept2707.pdf.
140. See id. at 9 (Commentary on Rule 2).
141. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-459 (2002); H.R. REP. NO. 101-512 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6879.
142. See JEFFREY N. BARR & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., STATEMENT OF
ALLEGATIONS AND REASONS IN CHIEF JUDGE DISMISSAL ORDERS UNDER THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND
DISABILITY ACT OF 1980, at 1 (2002).
143. The committee was appointed in May 2004, just two months after Chairman Sensenbrenner, at
a meeting presided over by the Chief Justice, pointedly commented on the “decidedly mixed record” of the
judiciary in administering the 1980 Act.  See supra note 134.
144. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 (Supp. IV 2004).  The procedures in Chapter 16 also provide the
channel for raising concerns about mental or physical disability on the part of a judge.  That aspect of the
statutory scheme is outside the scope of this Article, but two points deserve brief mention.  First, the Breyer
Committee found that almost all complaints filed under Chapter 16 allege misconduct rather than disability.
BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 137, at 123.  Second, some of the confidentiality provisions in
the statute may be more appropriate for dealing with disability than with misconduct.
In March 2008, the Judicial Conference of the United States approved a
new set of “Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability
Proceedings.”   The primary thrust of the new rules is to implement the138
Breyer Committee’s recommendations.   Unlike the Illustrative Rules, the139
2008 rules “provide mandatory and nationally uniform provisions” that will
govern all misconduct proceedings in the circuits.140
A striking feature of the post-1980 history is the central role of the House
Judiciary Committee and its leadership.  The 1990 amendments originated
with that Committee, as did the amendments in 2002.   A request from two141
key Committee members in 2002 prompted the Federal Judicial Center to
carry out a valuable supplementary study of how the Act was being
implemented.   Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed the Breyer Committee in142
response to criticism by Chairman Sensenbrenner regarding the handling of
several complaints against judges.143
B.  What Constitutes “Misconduct”?
Chapter 16 of the Judicial Code delineates the procedures for dealing with
possible misconduct by federal judges.   The definition of misconduct in144
§ 351(a) is as open-ended as it is terse: “conduct prejudicial to the effective
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145. BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 137, at 239.
146. NINTH CIRCUIT MISCONDUCT RULES, supra note 136, Rule 1(c).
147. Id. Rule 1(f).
148. Id.
149. See BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 137, at 141.
150. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 81 tbl. S-22 (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
judbus2006/completejudicialbusiness.pdf.  For further discussion, see infra Part II.D.
and expeditious administration of the business of the courts.”  In practice,
however, the vagueness of the statutory language is mitigated in two ways.
First, Chapter 16 itself contains a significant limitation on the potential
scope of the statute’s application.  Section 352(b)(1) authorizes the chief judge
to dismiss complaints that are “directly related to the merits of a decision or
procedural ruling.”  The purpose of this limitation, as the Breyer Committee
has explained, is to protect the “independence of the judge in the course of
deciding Article III cases and controversies.”   Circuit websites typically145
underscore the point by warning would-be complainants that misconduct
“does not include making wrong decisions—even very wrong decisions—in
cases.”   The courts add, by way of further emphasis:146
The complaint procedure is not intended to provide a means of obtaining review of
a judge’s decision or ruling in a case.  The judicial council of the circuit, the body
that takes action under the complaint procedure, does not have the power to change
a decision or ruling; only a court can do that.147
“Merits-related,” in this context, includes a judge’s failure to recuse.  On this
point, too, court websites are explicit: “The complaint procedure may not be
used to have a judge disqualified from sitting on a particular case.  A motion
for disqualification should be made in the case.”148
Notwithstanding these repeated admonitions, complainants continue to
invoke the Act to challenge rulings in particular cases.  Indeed, complaints of
this kind account for a very substantial portion of the total number of
complaints filed each year.  They are typically filed by prisoners and other pro
se litigants, and they are dismissed in accordance with the statute.   In 2006,149
for example, about three-quarters of the complaints concluded by chief judges
were dismissed as “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural
ruling.”150
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the “merits-related”
exclusion does not cut as deeply into the statute’s coverage as one might
expect.  As the Breyer Committee has explained, an allegation is merits-
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151. BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 137, at 239 (emphasis added).
152. See id. at 239-40, and MISCONDUCT RULES 2008, supra note 138, at 5-6 (Rule 3 cmt.), for useful
discussions of this point.
153. See BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 137, at 240.
154. Id.
155. The current version of the Code can be found at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/ch1.html.
In March 2008, the Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct published the draft of a proposed
new code and requested public comment on the revisions.  See Request for Public Comments on Revisions
to Code of Conduct for United States Judges, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/library/request_for_
comments_030708.cfm.
156. In addition to the Code and commentary, the United States Judicial Conference Committee on
Codes of Conduct has issued a collection of advisory opinions that interpret and apply the canons.  Links
to some of the opinions can be found at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/advisoryopinions.htm.
157. See, e.g., In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 91 F.3d 1416, 1417 (10th Cir. Jud. Council
1996).  The Code itself makes clear that disciplinary action is not necessarily appropriate “for every
violation of its provisions.”
related only if it does no more than call into question “the correctness of an
official action of a judge.”   If the complaint alleges that a judge’s action was151
the product of an illicit motive or a conspiracy or some other external
circumstance, it is not merits-related for purposes of the statute.152
A further complication is the relationship between the merits-related
exclusion and the processes of appellate review.  Most merits-related
complaints are subject to correction on appeal, but the availability—or
unavailability—of an appellate remedy is irrelevant to whether the complaint
is cognizable under Chapter 16.   If a complaint challenges the correctness153
of a judge’s ruling, it must be dismissed even if the complainant has no
appellate remedy.  Conversely, if an allegation is otherwise cognizable, it
should not be dismissed merely because it involves a ruling that has been
vacated on appeal.154
The merits-related exclusion serves an important role in defining what
does not constitute cognizable misconduct under the Act, but it does not help
to identify judicial behavior that does fall within Chapter 16’s scope.  For that,
the judges who administer the Act must look elsewhere.  And they do—to the
Code of Conduct for United States Judges.   The Code, promulgated by the155
Judicial Conference of the United States, consists of seven “canons,” most of
which have numerous subparts.  The canons and the accompanying
commentary provide detailed guidance for the conduct of judges both on and
off the bench.156
The judiciary has emphasized that violation of the Code, of itself, does
not necessarily constitute misconduct under the Act.   Nevertheless, in157
administering the Act, the judges have repeatedly looked to the Code for
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158. See, e.g., In re Complaint No. 329 (1st Cir. Jud. Council Aug. 15, 2002) (on file with the
author).  This complaint involved District Judge Edward Harrington.  For discussion see infra Part II.F.6.
159. See, e.g., In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 99-6-372-48 (6th Cir. Jud. Council
Nov. 2, 2001) (on file with the author).  This complaint involved District Judge Jon P. McCalla.  For
discussion see infra Part II.F.6.
160. See, e.g., In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 05-89097 (9th Cir. Jud. Council Nov. 16,
2006) (Report of the Special Committee), available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/misconduct/
orders/report.pdf [hereinafter Real Special Committee Report].  This order—which was not officially made
public until January 2008—involved District Judge Manuel Real.  For discussion see infra Part II.F.5.
161. See, e.g., In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 04-6-351-17 (6th Cir. Jud. Council
May 23, 2005) (on file with the author).  This order involved Chief Judge Danny Boggs of the Sixth Circuit.
162. See, e.g., In re Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 404 F.3d 688 (2d Cir. Jud. Council 2005).  This
proceeding involved Judge Guido Calabresi of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
163. See, e.g., In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 07-6-351-01 (6th Cir. Jud. Council 2007)
(on file with the author).  This complaint involved Judge Deborah L. Cook of the Sixth Circuit.  For
discussion, see infra Part II.F.2.
guidance in determining whether misconduct has occurred.  Here, by way of
example, are some of the Code provisions that have been invoked by chief
judges and circuit councils in considering complaints under the Act:
• Canon 2B: “A judge should not lend the prestige of the judicial
office to advance the private interests of others . . . .”158
• Canon 3A(3): “A judge should be patient, dignified, respectful, and
courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with
whom the judge deals in an official capacity . . . .”159
• Canon 3A(4): “[Except as authorized by law, a judge should] neither
initiate nor consider ex parte communications on the merits, or
procedures affecting the merits, of a pending or impending
proceeding.”160
• Canon 5B: “A judge may serve as [a director] of an educational [or
other] organization not conducted for the economic or political
advantage of its members, [but not] if it is likely that the organization
will be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the
judge or will be regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any
court.”161
• Canon 7A(2): “A judge should not . . . publicly endorse or oppose a
candidate for public office.”162
• Canon 7A(3): “A judge should not . . . solicit funds for or pay an
assessment or make a contribution to a political organization or
candidate . . . .”163
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164. 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) (Supp. IV 2004).  The statute also authorizes the chief judge to “identify a
complaint” and thus initiate the investigatory process even if no complaint has been filed by a litigant or
anyone else.  For discussion of this aspect of the statutory scheme, see infra Part II.F.2.
165. For discussion of this aspect of the statutory scheme, see infra Part II.F.1.
166. Id. § 351(c).
167. See id. §§ 352(b)(1)-(2), 353(a).
168. More precisely, track two is the “chief judge/special committee track.”  For ease of reference,
I will use the shorter label.
169. See § 352(c).
170. Id.  In the misconduct proceedings involving Judge Real, the Judicial Council of the Ninth
Circuit “affirmed” the order of the chief judge dismissing a complaint.  In re Complaint of Judicial
Misconduct, 425 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 2005).  This was technically incorrect.  The statute says:
“The denial of a petition for review of the chief judge’s order shall be final and conclusive and shall not
be judicially reviewable on appeal or otherwise.”  § 352(b) (emphasis added).  The implication is that if the
Judicial Council finds the appeal to be without merit, it should deny the petition for review, not affirm.
C.  Procedures Under Chapter 16
Ordinarily, the process under Chapter 16 begins with the filing of a
complaint about a judge with the clerk of the court of appeals for the circuit.164
“Any person” may file a complaint; the complainant need not have any
connection with the proceedings or activities that are the subject of the
complaint, nor must the complainant have personal knowledge of the facts
asserted.   The clerk must “promptly transmit” the complaint to the chief165
judge of the circuit.   The chief judge, after “expeditiously reviewing” the166
complaint, has three options: he or she can (a) dismiss the complaint;
(b) “conclude the proceeding” if he or she finds that “appropriate corrective
action has been taken or that action on the complaint is no longer necessary
because of intervening events”; or (c) appoint a special committee to
investigate the allegations.167
From a procedural perspective, options (a) and (b) are treated identically.
The statute can thus be viewed as establishing a two-track system for the
handling of complaints against judges.  Track one is the “chief judge track”;
track two is the “special committee track.”168
If the chief judge dismisses the complaint or terminates the proceeding,
a dissatisfied complainant may seek review of the decision by filing a petition
addressed to the judicial council of the circuit.   The judicial council may169
order further proceedings, or it may deny review.  If the judicial council
denies review, that is ordinarily the end of the matter; in track-one cases, the
statute provides that there is no further review “on appeal or otherwise.”170
However, the Judicial Conference of the United States now takes the position
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171. See infra Part II.F.4.
172. See § 353(a)(1).
173. See id. §§ 353(a)(1), 356.  For example, when the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit belatedly
appointed a special committee to investigate the allegations against Judge Manuel Real, the special
committee retained a prominent San Francisco lawyer as its counsel.  See Real Special Committee Report,
supra note 160, at 1.
174. See § 353(c).
175. Id.; § 354(a)(1).
176. See id. §§ 354(b)(1), 357(a).
177. See id. § 355(b)(1).
178. See id. § 331; In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 37 F.3d 1511-12 (U.S. Jud. Conference
1994).
179. See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 5
(Mar. 13, 2007).
that it has authority to require further proceedings even when the chief judge
and the circuit council have declared the matter closed.171
If the chief judge does not dismiss the complaint or terminate the
proceeding, he or she must promptly appoint a “special committee” to
“investigate the facts and allegations contained in the complaint.”   A special172
committee is composed of the chief judge and equal numbers of circuit and
district judges of the circuit.  Special committees have power to issue
subpoenas; sometimes they hire private counsel to assist in their inquiries.173
After conducting its investigation, the special committee files a report
with the circuit council.   The report must include the findings of the174
investigation as well as recommendations.  The circuit council then has a
variety of options: it may conduct its own investigation; it may dismiss the
complaint; or it may take action including the imposition of sanctions.175
Final authority within the judicial system rests with the Judicial
Conference of the United States.  A complainant or judge who is aggrieved by
an order of the circuit council can file a petition for review by the Conference;
in addition, the circuit council can refer serious matters to the Conference on
its own motion.   If the Conference determines that “consideration of176
impeachment may be warranted,” it may so certify to the House of
Representatives.177
Congress has authorized the Conference to delegate its review power to
a standing committee, and the Conference has done so.   Until 2007, the178
committee was known as the Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct
and Disability Orders.  The name was changed in 2007; it is now the
Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability.179
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180. This information is compiled and published pursuant to an explicit Congressional mandate.  See
28 U.S.C. § 604(h)(2) (Supp. VI 2004) (originally enacted as part of the 1980 Act).
181. See BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 137, at 132-43.
182. The Breyer Committee found some errors in the data submitted by the circuits to the AO.  The
Committee expressed particular concern about “the apparent underreporting of matters not dismissed by
the chief judge.”  Id. at 142.
183. Id. at 132.
184. Id. at 133.
185. Id. at 135.
186. See id. at 140; see also supra Part II.B.  Most of the orders dismissing complaints as “directly
related to the merits of a decision” are brief and formulaic.
187. See BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 137, at 140.  “Frivolous” complaints include those
that are “lacking sufficient evidence to raise an inference that misconduct has occurred [or] containing
allegations which are incapable of being established through investigation.”  28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(iii)
(Supp. IV 2004).  Technically, the statute treats the latter two grounds as separate from frivolousness.  See
id.
188. See BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 137, at 142.  As the Committee notes, this action
was not reported by the circuit council to the Administrative Office.  Id.  Based on the AO report, one
D.  Implementation of Chapter 16: The Statistics
Each year, the Director of the Administrative Office of United States
Courts (AO) includes in the AO’s annual statistical report a tabulation, based
on data submitted by the various circuits, of the number of complaints filed
and concluded during the preceding year.   In addition, the Breyer180
Committee carried out its own analysis of the raw data submitted to the AO
for the years 2001-2005.   That analysis, along with data in the AO reports181
for earlier years, gives us a good picture of how the statutory procedures have
been implemented by the judiciary.182
The number of complaints filed against judges each year ranges from 600
to 800.   In the five years studied by the Breyer Committee, 2001-2005, the183
total was 3,670.   (For reasons that are not clear, there was a “spike” in 1998,184
when the total exceeded 1,000.)   The overwhelming majority of the185
complaints—more than ninety-five percent—are dismissed by the chief judge.
In a majority of the dismissals, the chief judge relies on the provision of the
statute that authorizes dismissal of complaints that are “directly related to the
merits of a decision or procedural ruling.”   Another common reason for186
dismissal is that the complaint is “frivolous.”   Many chief judge orders give187
more than one reason, with “frivolous” and “merits-related” frequently paired.
About half of the complainants ask the circuit council to review the
dismissals, but almost none succeed; the Breyer Committee found only one
instance in which the circuit council directed the chief judge to appoint a
special committee.188
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would have concluded that review of dismissals was denied in every case in which it was sought.  For a
description of the complaint and its handling, see id. at 177; see also Bill Miller, Judge is Cleared of
Impropriety; No Political Motive Found in Assignment of Sensitive Cases, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2001,
at A21.  The special committee and the circuit council ultimately found no misconduct.  Id.
189. BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 137, at 141.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 142.
192. See supra Part II.D.
193. See Barr & Willing, supra note 115.
194. Id. at 79.
Disposition other than dismissal is rare.  In about one percent of the cases,
the chief judge concludes the proceeding on the ground that appropriate
corrective action has been taken or that, because of intervening events, action
is no longer necessary.   Appointment of a special committee is even rarer.189
The Breyer Committee found that in the five years 2001-2005, chief judges
appointed only nine special committees “to investigate 15 complaints filed
against nine judges.”   On the basis of the reports filed by the special190
committees, the circuit councils dismissed six complaints against five judges.
There were only four instances in which discipline was imposed by a circuit
council.  Two judges were publicly censured (in proceedings involving seven
complaints), and one judge was censured privately.  “Other discipline” was
imposed in the fourth case, but the case file is sealed, and no information is
available about the nature of the misconduct.191
E.  Evaluation of the Act’s Implementation
The numbers are stark: In the five years 2001-2005, more than 3,500
complaints were filed against federal judges, but only fifteen led to the
appointment of a special committee, and sanctions were imposed on only four
judges.   Based on this record, it is natural to ask: Are the chief judges and192
the circuit councils doing the job that Congress expected them to do?  Can
litigants and citizens rely on the judiciary to deal effectively with misconduct
in its ranks?  Two thorough and well-documented studies address those
questions.
The first study was conducted by Jeffrey Barr and Thomas Willging for
the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal.   The results193
of that research are reassuring.  For example, in a field study that examined
a sample of 469 complaints, the authors found only twelve “problem
dispositions.”194
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195. BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 137, at 121.
196. Id. at 206.
197. See id. at 207, 123.
198. Readers of this Article might think that “rare” is something of an overstatement, given the
numerous instances of misconduct by federal judges that are chronicled in these pages.  But the episodes
reported here took place over a period of more than a decade.  Today there are more than 2,000 federal
judges (including active judges, senior judges, magistrate judges, and bankruptcy judges).  In that light, I
think the characterization “rare” is justified.
More recently, the Breyer Committee undertook its own study using a
“research plan” that enabled it “to examine both (1) the vast bulk of
complaints that receive little or no public notice, and (2) the very few ‘high-
visibility’ complaints.”   Justice Breyer and his colleagues reached two195
major conclusions.  They found that
chief circuit judges and judicial councils are doing a very good overall job in
handling complaints filed under the Act.  The overall rate of problematic dispositions
is quite low and has not increased measurably over more than a decade despite steep
increases in the number of complaints filed and the overall workload of chief circuit
judges.196
But in separately assessing the “high-visibility cases,” the Committee found
“mishandling” in five out of seventeen—an “error rate” that it acknowledged
is “far too high.”197
In assessing the credibility of the generally positive assessment that
emerges from both studies, two other points deserve note.  First, before a
person becomes a federal judge, he or she will be investigated by the White
House, by the FBI, by home-state Senators, by the Senate Judiciary
Committee, by the American Bar Association, and by interest groups.
Individuals with serious problems of character or temperament are not likely
to make it through those many levels of scrutiny.  Against that background, it
would not be surprising if instances of misbehavior were rare.198
Second, the data in the two studies do not adequately reflect the informal
corrective processes that may take place in the absence of a formal complaint.
One of the most important findings of the research carried out for the National
Commission is that informal processes often operate very effectively to deal
with matters that fall within the potential reach of Chapter 16.  The Barr &
Willging study quotes comments by two former chief judges that capture the
experience in most of the circuits that the authors visited: “In my experience,
the most serious complaints never hit the complaint process.”  “There are
more remedial actions taking place outside the complaint process than
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199. Barr & Willging, supra note 115, at 131.  The full description in the study provides valuable
insights into the operation of informal processes.  See id. at 131-44.
200. Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 311
(1993).
201. Id. at 283.
202. Id. at 284; see also Collins T. Fitzpatrick, Misconduct and Disability of Federal Judges: The
Unreported Informal Responses, 71 JUDICATURE 282, 283 (1988) (“Over the last several years, there have
been at least nine federal judicial officers who retired after a judicial misconduct complaint was filed or was
looming in the background.”).
203. BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 137, at 203 (internal quotation marks omitted).
204. Id. at 221.  For a description of the program, see id. at 205-06.
205. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.  For a comprehensive discussion of the new rules,
see Arthur D. Hellman, When Judges Are Accused: An Initial Look at the New Federal Judicial
following formal complaints.”   A study by Professor Charles Geyh similarly199
noted how “successful” informal means were.200
At the same time, it is worth emphasizing that the informal mechanisms
derive some of their effectiveness from the existence of the formal complaint
procedure.  As Professor Geyh puts it, “The mere presence of more formal
means for remedying judicial misconduct provides an incentive for judges to
take seriously the informal suggestions of the chief circuit judge.”   Where201
the misconduct is particularly serious, a judge may be persuaded to retire
rather than face the prospect of a formal investigation and possible sanctions
under the Act.202
Although the Breyer Committee was not charged with studying informal
mechanisms, the Committee’s interviews made clear the continuing
importance of activities outside the complaint process.  As one chief judge
told the Committee, “The informal aspect is the most valuable part of the Act
. . . , the most serious matters were not the subject of a complaint at all.”203
The Committee also took note of a confidential counseling program in the
Ninth Circuit that may help to “get to the genuine sources of problematic
behavior.”204
F.  Current Issues in the Administration of Chapter 16
The research conducted by the Breyer Committee and by the National
Commission suggests that, overall, the system of decentralized self-regulation
of federal judicial ethics has worked well.  But no system is perfect, and
recent events—as well as the Breyer Committee report—have pointed to
several aspects of the Chapter 16 processes that deserve scrutiny.  Some of
these issues are addressed in the new national rules that were adopted by the
Judicial Conference of the United States at its March 2008 meeting.205
2007] JUDICIAL ETHICS 221
Misconduct Rules, 22 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL. (forthcoming 2008).
206. See Real Impeachment Hearing, supra note 2, at 33-35.
207. Id. at 8 (testimony of Judge Manuel Real).
208. Id. at 33 (reprinting Complaint against U.S. Dist. Judge Manuel L. Real (Feb. 21, 2003)).
209. Id. at 15-16.
210. See Real Impeachment Hearing, supra note 2, at 155-56 (remarks of Rep. Waters).
1.  Opportunity to File Malicious Complaints
The complaint that initiated the disciplinary proceedings against Judge
Manuel Real was filed by a Los Angeles lawyer named Stephen Yagman.206
Yagman had no connection with the bankruptcy case that was the subject of
the complaint, nor did he have any personal knowledge of the underlying
facts.   On the contrary, as his complaint made clear, his allegations were207
based on his reading of the appellate opinion in the case and “a little district
court docket research” motivated by his “curiosity [about] the opinion.”208
Most lawyers would not file a complaint against a judge based on their
reading of an appellate opinion and information on the public district court
docket.  Why did Yagman do so?  As Judge Real explained at the
impeachment hearing, there was a long history of antagonism between the
two:
In 1984, I sanctioned Mr. Yagman $250,000, the amount of the other side’s
attorneys’ fees, for his persistent and willful disregard of the federal rules and his
outrageous courtroom behavior in a defamation case I was handling.  [In re]
Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1986).  Though the Court of Appeals reversed the
sanction portion of my order, Mr. Yagman has had a personal vendetta against me
ever since.209
But under the current statutory scheme, none of that history makes any
difference.  “Any person” may file a complaint; motive (good or bad) and
knowledge (or lack of it) are irrelevant.
At the House impeachment hearing, one member of the Judiciary
Committee expressed concern about this aspect of the statutory arrangement.
She noted that there seemed to be “an element of revenge” in the filing of the
complaint against Judge Real, and she raised the question whether some
limitation might be imposed on “those who [can] bring complaints.”210
The concern is understandable, but it is not sufficient to justify a change
in the law.  Congress made a very considered and conscious decision in 1980
to let “any person” file a complaint.  Congress made that choice because it
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211. See infra Part II.F.5.  In January 2008 the order of reprimand was unanimously affirmed by the
Committee on Conduct and Disability of the Judicial Conference of the United States.  See supra note 5.
212. Will Evans, Judge Apologizes, CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING, Jan. 12, 2007,
http://www.centerforinvestigativereporting.org/articles/judgeapologizes (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).  The
account in this Article is based on that report and the links on the website.
213. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
214. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 07-6-351-01, at 2 (6th Cir. Jud. Council Jan. 10,
2007) (on file with the author).
thought that if the process was available only to insiders or people with
personal knowledge, some misconduct would never come to light.  The
consequence is that complaints can be filed solely for revenge or with other
malicious motives.  But circuit chief judges can and do deal with such abuses
by dismissing plainly insubstantial complaints.  Moreover, a malicious motive
does not necessarily mean that the complaint will be without merit.  Yagman’s
accusations may well have been the product of a “personal vendetta,” but two
months after the House impeachment hearing, the Judicial Council of the
Ninth Circuit found that Judge Real had indeed engaged in misconduct, and
it ordered a public reprimand.   The Council would never have investigated211
the matter if Yagman had not filed the complaint.
2.  Under-use of Chief Judge Authority to “Identify a Complaint”
A noteworthy feature of the misconduct statutes is that § 351(b) permits
the chief judge to “identify a complaint” and thus initiate the investigatory
process even if no complaint has been filed by a litigant or other person.  This
provision enables a chief judge to take preemptive action to cut short
controversy—and also to create a formal public record that will guide and
warn judges in the future.  The value of this tool can be seen by comparing the
responses of two chief judges to similar allegations against judges within their
respective circuits.
In 2006 the Center for Investigative Reporting disclosed that two federal
judges had made campaign contributions after their appointment to the federal
bench.   This was a violation of Canon 7(A)(3) of the Code of Conduct for212
United States Judges.   One of the judges was from the Sixth Circuit; the213
other, from the Ninth.  The chief judge of the Sixth Circuit identified a
complaint under § 351(b) and issued a formal order concluding the
proceeding.   The order was accompanied by a detailed memorandum and214
a letter from the judge acknowledging the misconduct and apologizing for it.
The judge—Deborah L. Cook—had previously served as an elected state
judge.  In her letter, she explained that she had not attended “the New Judges
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Circuit, to Danny J. Boggs, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, at 1 (Dec. 20,
2006) (on file with author).
216. See Evans, supra note 212.
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218. In fact, the Ninth Circuit district judge’s explanation did not account for all of the circumstances
detailed in the investigative report.  One donation listed the judge as the donor and “federal judge” as his
occupation.  But the judge’s wife had made other donations in her own name, listing her occupation as
“homemaker” or “not employed.”
219. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-769 (2002).
220. Id. at 9-10.
221. Id. at 1.  The Report made other accusations against the judge as well, but these were not so
clearly within the scope of the Act.
School offered . . . shortly after my confirmation” and thus was unaware of the
federal rule, “which differs from the strictures on my previous position.”215
In contrast, the chief judge of the Ninth Circuit “made an inquiry” but did
not identify a complaint under Chapter 16.   Thus, no formal order was ever216
issued.  Rather, a press spokesman responded to a reporter’s inquiry by saying
that the chief judge “accepted [the judge’s] explanation that his wife had made
the donations through a joint checking account.”217
Superficially, this is not very different from what happened in the Sixth
Circuit.  But by not identifying and concluding a complaint, the chief judge
of the Ninth Circuit missed an opportunity to reinforce not only the norms but
also their practical implications.  A formal order describing the circumstances
that created the impression of misconduct would have served as a warning to
other judges to maintain separate checking accounts or otherwise to arrange
their financial affairs to avoid violations of the prohibition.218
Identifying a complaint can serve a purpose even when it is unlikely that
the disposition will assist judges in complying with their ethical obligations.
The point is illustrated by a case described in the Breyer Committee report.
The controversy grew out of a hearing held by the House Judiciary Committee
in July 2002 to consider proposed sentencing legislation.   One witness at the219
hearing was James M. Rosenbaum, Chief Judge of the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota.   In October 2002, the Judiciary220
Committee issued its report on the bill.  The report accused Judge Rosenbaum
of making multiple misrepresentations in his testimony at the hearing.221
Sometime later, the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
telephoned the chief judge of the Eighth Circuit to inform him that the chief
counsel to the Judiciary Committee had suggested that the chief judge review
the committee report “with an eye toward instituting judicial misconduct
224 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:189
222. BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 137, at 189.
223. Id. at 190.
224. In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, No. 97-80629 (9th Cir. Jud. Council Aug. 5, 1998) (on
file with the author).  Judge Ware falsely stated that his brother had been shot dead in Alabama in 1963 in
a racially motivated murder.  The victim of the crime had a brother named James Ware, but that was not
the judge.  Id. at 4.
225. As the special committee said in the report adopted by the Circuit Council, “The
misrepresentations reflect negatively not only on Judge Ware’s integrity but quite possibly have had a
regrettable effect on public confidence in the Judiciary.”  Id. at 11.
226. BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 137, at 191.  In the Ware matter, the complaint was
identified by the chief judge, “prompted by a number of events that were reported widely in the media.”
In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, No. 97-80629, at 4.
227. BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 137, at 209.
proceedings against” Judge Rosenbaum.   The chief judge declined to do so.222
Instead, he wrote a letter to the AO director explaining that Judge
Rosenbaum’s allegedly false testimony could not constitute misconduct under
the Act because Judge Rosenbaum was not testifying as “part of his official
duties as a United States District Judge.”223
This conclusion is at odds with the generally accepted view of the Act’s
scope.  For example, in 1998 the Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit publicly
reprimanded District Judge James Ware for misrepresentations about his
family history that he made in comments to reporters and in public
speeches.   Although these falsehoods were much further removed from224
official duties than Judge Rosenbaum’s testimony at the House Judiciary
Committee hearing, the Ninth Circuit Council had no doubt that the judge’s
conduct fell within the Act.   Yet even if the Eighth Circuit chief judge’s225
assessment was correct, he showed poor judgment in declining to initiate the
formal process under the Act.  As the Breyer Committee states, in a case with
such high visibility, “the better course would have been . . . to identify a
complaint, undertake whatever limited inquiry was necessary, and dismiss any
elements that merited dismissal.”226
The Breyer Committee report encourages chief judges to make greater use
of “their statutory authority to identify complaints when accusations become
public.”   This is a sound recommendation.  If there is substance to the227
allegations, the public will be reassured that the judiciary is truly committed
to policing misconduct in its ranks.  If the allegations are without merit, the
process will help to remove the cloud that would otherwise hang over the
judge’s reputation.
The new national rules adopt only a watered-down version of the Breyer
Committee’s recommendation.  Under Rule 5(a), if a chief judge obtains
“information constituting reasonable grounds for inquiry into” possible
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234. Id. at 184.  As is its consistent practice, the Breyer Committee report does not identify the judge.
misconduct by a judge, the chief judge “may conduct an inquiry . . . into the
accuracy of the information.”   The chief judge may then seek an informal228
resolution.  But the chief judge is required to identify a complaint only when
“the evidence of misconduct is clear and convincing and no informal
resolution is achieved or is feasible.”   In my view, the new rule makes it too229
easy for the chief judge to do nothing in high-visibility situations such as the
one involving Judge Rosenbaum.  As the Breyer Committee puts it, “The more
public and high-visibility the unfiled allegations are, . . . the more desirable it
will be for the chief judge to identify a complaint in order to assure the public
that the judicial branch has not ignored the allegations and, more broadly, that
it is prepared to deal with substantive allegations.”   It is unfortunate that the230
new rules do not push chief judges more forcefully to adopt that approach.231
3.  Failure of Chief Judges to Appoint Special Committees
As amended in 2002, the misconduct statute draws a clear line between
the “chief judge track” and the “special committee track.”  The statute
provides: “The chief judge shall not undertake to make findings of fact about
any matter that is reasonably in dispute.”   If the facts are “reasonably in232
dispute,” a special committee must be appointed to carry out the investigation.
But experience reveals that, too often, chief judges have dismissed complaints
or concluded proceedings notwithstanding genuine disputes over facts or their
implications.  A recurring theme in the Breyer Committee’s account of
“problematic” cases is the failure of a chief judge “to submit clear factual
discrepancies to special committees for investigation.”233
One example cited by the Breyer Committee is the complaint against
Judge Manuel L. Real that later became the subject of the impeachment
hearing.   As previously noted, the complaint alleged that Judge Real had234
improperly intervened in a bankruptcy case to help a woman whose probation
he was supervising.  Chief Judge Mary M. Schroeder of the Ninth Circuit
initially dismissed the complaint upon finding that the charges were
“unsupported” and also that the complaint was “directly related to the merits
226 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:189
235. The order was never published officially, but it is included in the record of the impeachment
hearing.  See Real Impeachment Hearing, supra note 2, at 37-39 (reprinting In re Charge of Judicial
Misconduct, No. 03-89037 (9th Cir. Jud. Council July 14, 2003)).
236. Id. at 55 (reprinting In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, No. 03-89037 (9th Cir. Jud. Council
Nov. 4, 2004)).
237. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F.3d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 2005). 
238. See BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 137, at 188.  The misconduct complaint itself may
have contributed to this mishandling.  The complaint described the debtor as “comely” and said “it appears
that Judge Real acted inappropriately to benefit an attractive female whom he oddly had placed on
probation to himself.”  Real Impeachment Hearing, supra note 2, at 33, 35.  The unsubstantiated
insinuation of sexual impropriety may well have led the judges to treat the allegations of abuse of power
less seriously than they would have done if the complaint had been limited to the latter.
239. See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F.3d 1179, 1199-1201 (9th Cir. Jud. Council
2005) (reprinting Judicial Council Order of Dec. 18, 2003).
240. The Breyer Committee found numerous faults in the handling of the complaint against Judge
Real.  See BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 137, at 184-89.  The report states: “The chief judge
and judicial council actions are inconsistent with our Standards in respect to the chief judge’s fact finding
and the council’s finding of corrective action.”  Id. at 188. 
241. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  The Breyer Committee report does not identify
the case or the judge. 
of” the bankruptcy case.   The Circuit Council vacated the dismissal order235
and remanded for further proceedings; the chief judge then dismissed the
complaint again, this time on the grounds that the factual allegations were “not
reasonably in dispute” and that Judge Real’s assumption of jurisdiction over
the bankruptcy case had a “legitimate basis.”   That ruling was affirmed by236
the Circuit Council, but on the basis that “adequate corrective action has been
taken.”237
As the Breyer Committee stated, both the chief judge and the circuit
council departed from the requirements of Chapter 16.   The chief judge238
improperly engaged in fact-finding, and the Circuit Council went astray in
finding that corrective action had been taken.  Moreover, the chief judge’s
error was compounded by the action of the circuit council in its review of the
first order dismissing the complaint.  It is plain from the council’s
memorandum that it believed that there were factual issues that remained
unresolved.   But instead of directing the chief judge to appoint a special239
committee, the council undertook its own investigation.240
The Breyer Committee also cited a case from the Sixth Circuit that in
some respects is even more troublesome.  The case involved the legal
challenge to the University of Michigan law school affirmative action plan
that ultimately went to the United States Supreme Court.   The complaint241
alleged that the circuit chief judge manipulated the court’s procedures for en
banc hearing in order to preclude participation by two circuit judges who
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245. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 03-6-372-07 (6th Cir. Jud. Council May 28, 2003)
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247. MISCONDUCT RULES 2008, supra note 138, at 14 (Rule 11 cmt.).
might have been expected to oppose the chief judge’s position.   Obviously242
the chief judge was recused from considering the complaint, so the matter was
dealt with by an acting chief judge.  The acting chief judge “found adverse
facts to be undisputed and said those facts created an ‘inference of
misconduct.’”   But she did not ask the accused judge if he disputed the243
facts—as indeed he did.   Instead, she concluded the proceedings based on244
corrective action and intervening events.   The result, as the Breyer245
Committee said, “was a finding of misconduct and a public reprimand without
a hearing.”246
In these and other cases, the chief judges appear to have misapprehended
the import of the statutory language—and also the structure of the system
established by Congress.  The standard for appointing a special committee is
not a stringent one.  Any genuine dispute over facts—whether small or
large—requires that the complaint be placed on the special committee track.
At the same time, it is worth emphasizing that special committee
procedures need not be elaborate.  If the factual issues are simple, the
committee can proceed quickly, without hiring outside counsel.  But the more
formal procedure will provide reassurance that the facts have been developed
and that dismissal of the complaint—if that is the result—is justified.
The proposed national rules are consistent with the approach suggested
here, although the rules themselves may not sufficiently emphasize the narrow
scope of the “limited inquiry” that the chief judge may undertake.  The
commentary states that a matter is not “reasonably” in dispute—and thus may
be resolved by the chief judge—“if a limited inquiry shows that the allegations
. . . lack any reliable factual foundation, or that they are conclusively refuted
by objective evidence.”   The implication is that if the allegations have some247
reliable factual foundation, or if objective evidence leaves some room for
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251. See id. at 108.
252. Id. at 108-09.
253. Id. at 109.
254. Id. at 116 (Winter, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 115.
crediting them, a special committee must be appointed.  It would be better to
make this standard explicit.248
4.  Limited Powers of the Judicial Conference Review Committee
After the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint against Judge Real, attorney-complainant Stephen Yagman asked
the Judicial Conference of the United States to review the Council’s action.249
The Conference referred the matter to its Committee to Review Circuit
Council Conduct and Disability Orders (later renamed the Committee on
Conduct and Disability).   By a three-to-two vote, the Committee found that250
it had no jurisdiction “to address the substance of the complaint.”   The251
majority explained: “[T]he statute gives the Committee no explicit authority
to review the Judicial Council’s order affirming the chief judge’s dismissal of
the complaint.  We believe it inappropriate to find that we have implicit
authority.”   The panel also noted the language of 28 U.S.C. § 352(c): “The252
[circuit council’s] denial of a petition for review of the chief judge’s order
shall be final and conclusive and shall not be judicially reviewable on appeal
or otherwise.”253
Two committee members, dissenting, objected that the majority’s holding
“means that chief circuit judges and circuit judicial councils are free to
disregard statutory requirements.  In fact, by disregarding those requirements,
they may escape review of their decisions.”   The dissent described in some254
detail the factual issues left unresolved by the proceedings in the Ninth
Circuit.  It added: “The absence of a special committee has left the record in
this matter something of a black box.”   Implicitly, the dissent was saying255
that the circuit council had undertaken to perform the investigative functions
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2007).
263. MISCONDUCT RULES 2008, supra note 138, at 30-32 (Rules 21-22).
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of the special committee, but without the procedural protections and appellate
rights that are part of that track.
Apparently perturbed by this result, the Executive Committee of the
Judicial Conference asked the Conduct Committee to consider “possible
legislative or other action to address the jurisdictional problem” that the
opinions in the Real matter had identified.   The Conduct Committee did so256
at its meeting in January 2007.  By that time, the Committee membership had
changed.   The reconstituted Committee concluded that in track-one cases257
the Judicial Conference does have the authority to determine “whether a
particular misconduct complaint requires the appointment of a special
investigating committee.”   The Committee urged the Judicial Conference258
to “take action to explicitly authorize the Committee” to exercise this
authority.   Under the Committee’s proposal, review would be mandatory “if259
any member of a judicial council expressly requests such review” or argues
in dissent that appointment of a special committee is warranted.   In other260
cases, review would be available “at the discretion of the Committee.”261
The Judicial Conference considered the Committee recommendations at
its March 2007 meeting.  It asked the Committee “to prepare for Conference
consideration” rules that would implement the Committee’s
recommendations.   The Committee did so, and the rules adopted by the262
Conference in March 2008 include provisions for review along the lines of the
January 2007 proposal.263
In support of its conclusion that the Judicial Conference has a power of
review even when no special committee has been appointed in the circuit, the
Conduct Committee relied on two provisions of Title 28.  First, the Committee
cited § 331, the statute that defines the powers of the Judicial Conference.264
One sentence in the statute authorizes the Judicial Conference to “prescribe
and modify rules for the exercise of the authority provided in chapter 16.”
The Committee also relied on § 358(a).  That section empowers the
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Conference to “prescribe such rules for the conduct of proceedings under
[Chapter 16], including the processing of petitions for review, as [it] considers
to be appropriate.”
The Conduct Committee did not explain how its recommendation could
be reconciled with the seemingly explicit prohibition in 28 U.S.C. § 352(c),
quoted earlier: “The [circuit council’s] denial of a petition for review of the
chief judge’s order shall be final and conclusive and shall not be judicially
reviewable on appeal or otherwise.”   Perhaps the most plausible explanation265
is that the Committee views the proposed exercise of authority as a separate
proceeding rather than as a review of the circuit council’s disposition.266
Under this rationale, if the Judicial Conference (or its Conduct Committee)
concludes that the circuit council was wrong in denying review of a chief
judge dismissal order, it would not reverse the denial; rather, it would simply
direct that a special committee be appointed.267
Or would it?  The Conduct Committee was actually rather circumspect in
defining the precise scope of the review power it contemplated.  In its report
to the Judicial Conference, the Committee repeatedly stated that upon
adoption of its proposal the Committee would have authority to “examine”
whether a misconduct complaint requires the appointment of a special
committee.  But what did the Committee plan to do if, after examining a
complaint, it found that a special committee should be appointed?  The
Committee did not say.  In particular, it did not say that the Committee would
order the appointment.  Nor do the newly adopted rules say this.  Rule
21(b)(2) provides only that “[i]f the committee determines that a special
committee should be appointed, the Committee must issue a written decision
giving its reasons.”268
At the hearing on the bill to create an Inspector General for the federal
judiciary, I suggested that the proposed new office could serve to fill the “gap”
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in Chapter 16 that was revealed by the Conduct Committee’s conclusion that
it had no jurisdiction over the complaint involving Judge Real.   The269
Conduct Committee has now changed course, and it believes that it can fill the
gap within the framework of the existing legislation.  The proposed new
approach represents sound policy, both in general outline and in the provision
for mandatory review if any member of the circuit council requests it.  But the
preferable way of implementing the suggestion would be through statutory
amendment.  The proposed rule appears to stretch the language of Title 28,
with the purpose of allowing the reopening of disciplinary proceedings that
would otherwise have concluded.  In that setting, there should be no room for
doubt as to the legitimacy of what is being done.270
5.  Undue Bias Against Public Disclosure
Except in the rare case where the Judicial Conference determines that
impeachment may be warranted, Chapter 16 provides for only limited public
disclosure in misconduct proceedings.  Written orders issued by a judicial
council or by the Judicial Conference of the United States to implement
disciplinary action must be made available to the public.   But unless the271
judge who is the subject of the accusation authorizes the disclosure, “all
papers, documents, and records of proceedings related to investigations
conducted under [Chapter 16] shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed
by any person in any proceeding.”   The statute is silent on the handling of272
chief judge orders dismissing a complaint or terminating a proceeding.
The Illustrative Rules fill in some of the statutory gaps, but they too
evince a bias against disclosure.  The basic rule is that orders and memoranda
of the chief judge and the judicial council will be made public only “when
final action on the complaint has been taken and is no longer subject to
review.”   Moreover, in the ordinary case where the complaint is dismissed,273
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In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 04-89030, at 3 (9th Cir. Jud. Council May 23, 2006)
(Schroeder, C.J.) (on file with the author) (emphasis added).
276. Report to the Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit from the Committee Convened Pursuant to
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05-89097 and 04-89039 Pertaining to Complaint No. 05-89097, at 15-16 (Nov. 16, 2006), available at
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277. See id. at 27-29, 31-32.
278. See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 05-89097 (9th Cir. Jud. Council Nov. 16,
2006), available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/misconduct/orders/council-order.pdf.
279. Id. at 2.
280. See supra note 5.  It remains something of a mystery why the Conduct Committee took so long
to complete the appellate process.
281. Henry Weinstein, Panel Votes to Censure U.S. Judge, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2006, at A1,
“the publicly available materials will not disclose the name of the judge
complained about without his or her consent.”274
The consequences of the bias against disclosure can be seen in a later
stage of the proceedings involving Judge Real.  After the Judicial Conference
of the United States determined that it had no power to review the Judicial
Council decision affirming the dismissal of the complaint, Chief Judge Mary
M. Schroeder appointed a special committee to investigate Judge Real’s
conduct.   The special committee carried out a thorough inquiry; it heard275
testimony from eighteen witnesses and reviewed thousands of pages of
documents.   It found that Judge Real had committed misconduct, and it276
recommended the sanction of a public reprimand.277
On November 16, 2006, the circuit council issued an order adopting the
findings and recommendations of the special committee.   But the order was278
not made public at that time.  Rather, the order stated that it would be made
public “when the order is no longer subject to review, or within 30 days of this
order if no petition for review has been filed with the Judicial Conference of
the United States.”   Judge Real did file a petition for review, and the279
petition remained under consideration by the Judicial Conference Conduct
Committee for more than a year.  As a result, the Judicial Council order was
not disclosed officially until January 2008.   Meanwhile, however, a copy of280
the order reached reporter Henry Weinstein of the Los Angeles Times, who
published an article in December 2006 describing its contents.281
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283. ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 133, Rule 17 cmt.  The authors concede that this is not
necessarily the only way of reading the statute:
[P]ublic availability of orders under [28 U.S.C. § 354(a)] is a statutory requirement.  The statute
does not prescribe the time at which these orders must be made public, and it might be thought
implicit that it should be without delay.  Similarly, the statute does not state whether the name
of the judge must be disclosed, but it could be argued that such disclosure is implicit.
Id.
284. Even in that circumstance, the non-disclosure policy is debatable.  Certainly other public
officials do not enjoy protection from “public airing of unfounded charges.”  But just as the Supreme Court
has recognized that not all speech by government employees about the operation of government offices
deserves First Amendment protection, see Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006), one can argue that
there is no legitimate public interest in learning the identity of a judge who has been the subject of a totally
meritless accusation of misconduct.
In withholding immediate disclosure of its order, the Ninth Circuit
Judicial Council relied on the council’s Rule 17, which in turn is based on the
Illustrative Rules.   The underlying policy is that judges should be protected282
“from public airing of unfounded charges.”  As explained in the Illustrative
Rules:
We believe that it is consistent with the congressional intent to protect a judge
from public disclosure of a complaint, both while it is pending and after it has been
dismissed if that should be the outcome. . . .
. . . .
. . . In view of the legislative interest in protecting a judge from public airing of
unfounded charges, . . . the law is reasonably interpreted as permitting nondisclosure
of the identity of a judicial officer who is ultimately exonerated and also permitting
delay in disclosure until the ultimate outcome is known.283
This rationale may be persuasive when (for example) a disgruntled litigant or
a discharged employee has filed scurrilous—and baseless—accusations
against a federal judge, and disclosure would cause injury to the judge without
enlightening the public on a matter of public concern.   But the current284
policy makes little sense in the setting of the proceedings against Judge Real.
Even if one accepts “the legislative interest in protecting a judge from public
airing of unfounded charges,” delaying disclosure of the Judicial Council
order did nothing to serve that interest.  The allegations had already been the
subject of published opinions by the judiciary and a televised hearing in
Congress.  What is even worse, adherence to the deferred-disclosure rule had
the perverse consequence of putting off the day when the public would see the
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serious and conscientious way in which the judiciary dealt with the
accusations.
The bias against disclosure can also be seen in the report of the Breyer
Committee.  The report analyzes seventeen “high-visibility” complaints from
the period 2001-2005.   For each complaint the report provides a detailed285
account of the allegations and the procedures followed by chief judges and
circuit councils in considering them.  But not a single one of the judges is
identified.  This is so even though the complaints had been selected for the
very reason that they had become the subject of discussion in the media or in
Congress.   Of course these other sources do name the judges.  Indeed, the286
judges’ names are given in several of the orders that the Breyer Committee
quotes.
Why then the reticence on the part of the Committee?  The report cites
Rule 16(h) of the Illustrative Rules, which calls for “appropriate steps . . . to
shield the identities of the judge complained against, the complainant, and
witnesses from public disclosure.”   But it hardly seems appropriate for the287
Committee to shield the identity of the judges in its report when the
information has already been disclosed publicly elsewhere.  And the attempt
to preserve the judges’ anonymity exacts a cost.  First, other researchers are
put to unnecessary labor to carry out follow-up studies or simply to make their
own assessment of how the complaints were handled.  Second and more
important, by withholding the judges’ names, the report reinforces the
perception that the judiciary is more concerned with protecting its members
than it is with transparency and accountability.
In my view, the policy should be this: When the substance of a pending
complaint has become widely known through reports in mainstream media or
responsible websites, there should be a presumption that orders issued by
chief judges or circuit councils will be made public as soon as they are issued.
In that circumstance there should also be a presumption that the order will
disclose the identity of the judge.  And once the information has become part
of the official record, the judiciary should not withhold it from later reports
or official documents.288
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291. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 111, at 345.
292. The letter is reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 107-459, at 16-18 (2002).
293. Id. at 16.
The new national rules do not adopt this approach.  Rather, they embrace
the restrictive policy of the Illustrative Rules: orders entered by the chief
circuit judge and the judicial council must be made public, but only “[w]hen
final action has been taken on a complaint and it is no longer subject to
review.”   There is no exception for situations where the existence of the289
proceedings has been disclosed, irrespective of the nature or extent of the
disclosure.  Based on the analysis above, I believe that this approach is short-
sighted, and that a more flexible policy would be preferable.290
6.  Failure to Make the Process Visible
One purpose of the mechanism established by the 1980 Act is, of course,
to foster public confidence in the federal judiciary.  To that end, the
mechanism must be visible.  Visibility in this context entails two overlapping
elements: the availability of the process must be made known to potential
complainants, and the results of the process must be made known to all who
are interested in the effective operation of the judicial system.
If there is a single glaring flaw in the administration of Chapter 16, it is
the failure of judges at every level to make the process visible.  This has been
a problem for many years.  In 1993, the National Commission reported:
“Surveys conducted for the Commission demonstrate both widespread
ignorance about the Act in virtually every respondent group and a widely
shared perception that some meritorious complaints are never filed.”   In291
2001, at the House Judiciary hearing on the operation of the misconduct
statutes, concerns about lack of visibility again came to the forefront.
Following the 2001 hearing, Chairman Coble and Ranking Member
Berman wrote a letter to Chief Justice Rehnquist noting that the statute was
“under-publicized.”   They offered two specific suggestions for enhancing292
visibility.  First, the Judicial Conference should require “that every federal
court include a prominent link on its web site to the rules and forms for filing
complaints . . . concerning any judge of that court.”   Second, chief judges293
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of General Counsel in the Administrative Office.”  BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 137, at 217.
To outsiders, of course, it makes little difference which room in the Thurgood Marshall Judiciary Building
serves as the repository if the orders are not available online.
300. Curiously, in one of the Breyer Committee’s high-visibility cases, the circuit published the initial
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and circuit councils should make their rulings under the 1980 Act more widely
available to the public.294
In September 2002 the Judicial Conference endorsed both of these
suggestions.   But Judicial Conference policy does not necessarily translate295
into action at the local level.  In 2005, when Breyer Committee researchers
examined district court websites, they could not find any information about
the complaint procedure on a majority of the sites.   And of the forty-one296
sites that had some information, many presented it “in a way that would stump
most persons seeking to learn about how to file a complaint.”297
Nor has the Judicial Conference’s exhortation resulted in wider
availability of misconduct rulings.  Today as in 2001—with three
exceptions —the orders and memoranda filed by the chief judges of the298
various circuits are available only at the clerk’s office of the circuit where they
were issued and at the Federal Judicial Center, to which copies are sent.299
Even non-routine dispositions are usually not posted on court websites, nor are
they provided to legal publishers like Westlaw and Lexis.  Of the sixteen final
orders of chief judges or circuit councils discussed in the Breyer Committee
report’s compilation of “high-visibility” complaints, only four can readily be
found in the Federal Reporter or any online database.300
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Two of the cases are particularly noteworthy in this context.  One
involved a district judge’s intervention in a federal sentencing proceeding.  On
July 31, 2002, Senior District Judge Edward F. Harrington of the District of
Massachusetts wrote a letter on official court stationery to another judge on
his court urging him to be lenient in sentencing a retired FBI special agent
who had been convicted on racketeering charges.   The letter became public301
the next day, and it aroused considerable criticism.   On August 5, Judge302
Harrington withdrew the letter, but he insisted that he had done nothing
wrong.  “I believed that my letter was entirely proper as it was requested by
the defendant, relates specialized knowledge I acquired as a federal
prosecutor, and concerns the type of information traditionally considered by
sentencing courts,” he wrote.303
Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the letter, on August 15 Chief Judge
Michael Boudin of the First Circuit invoked his authority to “identify a
complaint” against Judge Harrington.   He asked Judge Harrington to304
respond, and within days, Judge Harrington did so.  No longer did he deny
wrongdoing.  Instead, he wrote:
Upon reflection, I did commit a clear violation of Canon 2(B) of the Code of
Conduct for United States Judges in writing a letter to District Judge Tauro relating
to the sentencing in a criminal matter.  For this act, I am exceedingly sorry and
sincerely apologize to the Judicial Council and to my fellow judges in the First
Circuit.305
Based on Judge Harrington’s response, Chief Judge Boudin determined that
“appropriate corrective action has been taken without the necessity of a formal
investigation.”   He relied on “Judge Harrington’s withdrawal of his July 31306
letter, his admission of a clear violation of the Code of Conduct, his sincere
apology, and his agreement to allow all complaint materials to be made
public.”307
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As the Breyer Committee aptly observes, the handling of this matter “is
a model for the effective administration of the Act.”   The Committee gives308
some of the reasons: “The corrective action was action taken by the [accused]
judge himself, was commensurate with the violation, was tailored to provide
whatever benefit was possible to persons directly affected by the violation,
and was swiftly made public.”   To this I would add that the chief judge309
deserves credit also for initiating the process without waiting for a complaint
from a member of Congress or other outsider.  Yet this “model” disposition
is virtually invisible.  It was never published officially, and if the Breyer
Committee had not featured it in its report it would have disappeared down the
memory hole.
The complaint against Judge Harrington illustrates the effective handling
of a single act of misconduct that generated public attention at a particular
moment in time.  The Breyer Committee also describes the effective handling
of a complaint involving a pattern of misconduct over a period of years.310
The judge in question was District Judge Jon P. McCalla of the Western
District of Tennessee.  Judge McCalla’s courtroom behavior came to public
attention in March 2000, when a Sixth Circuit appellate panel, in a strongly
worded opinion, reprimanded him for “intemperate demeanor toward [a
criminal defendant’s] counsel.”   The court condemned a “lengthy harangue”311
by Judge McCalla and said that it created an appearance of bias.   At about312
the same time, formal complaints were filed against Judge McCalla under the
1980 Act.   The complaints “portray[ed] the . . . judge as erratic and313
obsessed with courtroom ethics.”314
Sixth Circuit Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., appointed a special
committee to investigate the allegations.   The special committee hired an315
outside counsel, who interviewed numerous witnesses.   On August 29,316
2001, the special committee prepared to hold a formal hearing.  Instead, Judge
McCalla appeared personally, apologized for his misbehavior, and agreed to
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take a leave of absence for a minimum of six months.  He also agreed to
undergo behavioral counseling.  The special committee filed a report
endorsing this resolution, and the Judicial Council adopted an order
implementing the terms of the settlement.  The order included an unusual
provision giving the special committee “continuing jurisdiction to monitor
Judge McCalla’s progress and the authority to approve on behalf of the
Council Judge McCalla’s return to the bench upon the advice of the
[committee’s] expert after consultation with Judge McCalla’s treating
psychiatrist.”317
Judge McCalla complied with the terms of the settlement, and after six
months he asked the special committee to allow him to resume his judicial
duties.   The committee did not do so immediately, but in September 2002318
it released Judge McCalla from his suspension, and Judge McCalla returned
to the bench (although he was prohibited from hearing cases involving certain
lawyers “because of past conflicts”).   Eight months later, he was receiving319
“glowing” reviews from lawyers practicing in his courtroom.   An editorial320
in the leading local newspaper commented that Judge McCalla’s return to the
bench demonstrated that “[b]eing a judge is apparently what he was meant to
do.”321
The Breyer Committee justifiably characterizes the Sixth Circuit’s
handling of this matter as “a deft resolution of a difficult problem, giving full
effect to the statutory policies of reforming judicial misconduct, maintaining
public confidence in the judiciary, and preserving judges’ independence.”322
Yet this order, too, has not been posted on any judiciary website, nor was it
made available to legal publishers.  Like the “model” disposition involving
Judge Harrington, this one is virtually invisible.
It is understandable that the judiciary does not wish to shine the spotlight
on misconduct within its ranks; no institution does.  However, to the extent
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that the low visibility is the result of conscious choice (rather than
indifference or inadvertence), the policy is misguided.  The courts benefit if
they learn about problems at the earliest possible stage, and complaints under
Chapter 16 can help.  But some meritorious complaints will never be filed if
the existence of the process is insufficiently publicized or if would-be
complainants see no evidence that complaints are taken seriously.  Failure to
publicize dispositions hurts in another way: circuit councils and chief judges
lose the opportunity to learn how other courts are handling allegations of
misconduct or disability.  More than a decade ago, the National Commission
emphasized the importance of “developing a body of interpretive precedents”
that would help fill in the interstices of the Act.   That need remains largely323
unfilled today.
The most compelling reason for greater visibility, however, is external.
At a recent conference on the operation of appellate courts, a lawyer
commented that in the current political climate, judges cannot argue for
judicial independence by saying simply, “Just trust us.”   This observation324
is even more apt in the context of regulating ethics in the judiciary.  It is not
enough that the misconduct procedures work; they must be seen to work.
Even when judges acknowledge the importance of visibility, their actions
do not always comport with their words.  I have already mentioned that in
1998 the Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit reprimanded District Judge
James Ware for “publicly misrepresent[ing] himself as the James Ware whose
younger brother, Virgil, was shot and killed in 1963 while both were riding a
bicycle in Birmingham, Alabama.”   The special committee report, which325
was adopted by the circuit council, pointedly states: “Because of the very
public nature of the original tragedy and the public nature of the
misrepresentations, as well as their discovery, it is important that discipline
of Judge Ware be public and a part of the historical record.”   Yet anyone326
looking in the places where one would expect to find “the historical record”
of a judicial ruling—the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals website or the legal
databases—would come away empty-handed.
2007] JUDICIAL ETHICS 241
327. See BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 137, at 219.
328. See id. at 117-19.
329. ILLUSTRATIVE RULES, supra note 133, Rule 17(b).  The newly adopted misconduct rules speak
in similar terms.  See MISCONDUCT RULES 2008, supra note 138, at 36 (Rule 24(b)).
330. BREYER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 137, at 123.
The Breyer Committee called for aggressive action to enforce the two
September 2002 exhortations of the Judicial Conference.  It recommended that
judicial councils require the courts within their circuits to post information on
the home pages of court websites.   And it urged the Judicial Conference to327
make misconduct orders more widely available—specifically, to post “non-
routine” dispositions on the judicial branch’s public website.   These modest328
steps are long overdue.
And more can be done.  The Illustrative Rules now provide: “In cases in
which [chief judge or circuit council] memoranda appear to have precedential
value, the chief judge may cause them to be published.”   This is too329
grudging.  First, publication should be encouraged not only when dispositions
“appear to have precedential value,” but also when they resolve complaints
that have been the subject of discussion in the media or in Congress.  Second,
the rule should encourage chief judges and circuit councils to provide
sufficient explanation in their orders to enable outsiders to assess the
appropriateness of the disposition.  If—as in the McCalla case—a detailed
account might interfere with the effectiveness of the remedy, the detail can be
omitted.  But that situation will not be common.
Visibility-enhancing measures like these serve a purpose irrespective of
the outcome of the proceedings.  If the judge is found to have engaged in
misconduct, the media and interested citizens can ascertain whether the circuit
council has dealt with the matter appropriately.  If the judge is exonerated,
people will be able to find out why.  A thorough explanation will help build
confidence in the courts; it will also help to clear the judge’s name.
III.  CONCLUSION
In the overwhelming majority of cases, the federal judiciary acts
conscientiously and effectively to deal with complaints asserting that judges
have failed to comply with the high ethical standards we expect of them.  But
as the Breyer Committee pointed out, it is the few high-visibility controversies
that shape public perceptions, and as to those, the record is more mixed.330
If there is a single thread that runs through the various lapses chronicled
by the Committee and other observers, it is this: at each stage of the process,
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the chief judge or circuit council opts for the action that is less structured and
less public.  The chief judge conducts an inquiry but does not formally
“identify a complaint.”  The chief judge investigates factual matters that are
in dispute but does not establish a special committee.  The chief judge or
circuit council resolves a complaint but does not post the opinion on the
court’s website or make it available to online services.
To remedy these failings, the Breyer Committee offers a number of
specific recommendations that point in the direction of greater procedural
formality and enhanced visibility.  But the Committee’s most important
recommendation is, in essence, organizational.  The recommendation is
addressed in the first instance to the Judicial Conference of the United States,
and it involves the responsibilities and powers of the committee then known
as the Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability Orders.
Justice Breyer and his colleagues call upon the Conference to give the
Committee “a new, formally recognized, vigorous advisory role” in guiding
and counseling chief circuit judges and judicial councils in implementing the
1980 Act.   In addition, the Breyer Committee urges the Committee itself to331
consider “periodic monitoring of the Act’s administration.”332
The Judicial Conference has already taken steps to implement these
suggestions.  As already noted, the Conference changed the name of the
Review Committee; the committee is now known as the Committee on
Judicial Conduct and Disability.   The revised nomenclature appears to333
contemplate a broader assignment of responsibilities and perhaps also a more
forward-looking perspective.  Consistent with that assessment, the Conference
directed the newly renamed committee “to recommend guidelines and, if
necessary, new rules for implementing the judicial disability statute in a
uniform manner throughout the federal court system.”   The Committee did334
as requested; the proposed national rules will “provide mandatory and
nationally uniform provisions governing the substantive and procedural
aspects of misconduct and disability proceedings under the Act.”335
Implicit in the Breyer Committee’s organizational recommendations is a
twofold judgment: first, that self-regulation of federal judicial ethics requires
a somewhat greater degree of centralization than now exists; and, second, that
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it is desirable to have an entity within the judiciary whose single function
is—and is known to be—that of strengthening judicial ethics and enhancing
transparency.   In these respects, the Breyer Committee’s prescription bears336
a close resemblance to the approach taken by Chairman Sensenbrenner in his
proposal to establish an Inspector General for the Judicial Branch.   I do not337
minimize the other features of the bill—the ones that the judiciary denounced
in such strong terms.  But I believe that these elements could have been
modified in an acceptable way if both sides had looked for common ground.338
In any event, if the judiciary whole-heartedly implements the Breyer
Committee recommendations, further legislation need not go beyond fine-
tuning the existing system.
But more is at stake than the effective operation of the procedures that
govern the regulation of federal judicial ethics.  There is widespread concern
today about threats to the independence of the judiciary.  My own view is that
the perception of threats is overdrawn,  but if the judiciary is to defend itself339
successfully against incursions on its independence, the public must believe
that the system of self-regulation is working.  By adopting the
recommendations of the Breyer Committee, the Judicial Conference has taken
an important step in the right direction.  But what is more important is that the
judiciary internalize a genuine commitment to transparency and visibility in
the regulation of ethics.  Today’s technology readily provides the means; all
that is required is the will.
